Florida Journal of International Law
Volume 33

Issue 1

Article 4

September 2021

Brexit as an Arbitrary Withdrawal of European Union Citizenship
William Thomas Worster

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil

Recommended Citation
Worster, William Thomas (2021) "Brexit as an Arbitrary Withdrawal of European Union Citizenship," Florida
Journal of International Law: Vol. 33: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol33/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Worster: Brexit as an Arbitrary Withdrawal of European Union Citizenship

BREXIT AS AN ARBITRARY WITHDRAWAL OF EUROPEAN
UNION CITIZENSHIP
William Thomas Worster*
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................

95

I.

INTERNATIONAL LAW ON NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP ...... 97

II.

EUROPEAN UNION CITIZENSHIP..............................................106

III.

ACQUISITION OF EU CITIZENSHIP..........................................109

IV.

LOSS OF EU CITIZENSHIP .......................................................

1 13

V.

THE CASE OF BREXIT .............................................................

121

CONCLUSION.........................................................................................133
INTRODUCTION

Millions of Britons are currently exercising their EU citizenship rights
by living and working in other EU member states, so it was with shock
that they learned that the UK electorate had voted in favor of leaving the
EU (Brexit).- Following the referendum, these Britons living in EU
member states,' and the millions of Europeans living in the UK, began to
fear for their status and residence rights: a fear that has not been
diminished by the agreement between the EU and UK on the withdrawal
terms (Withdrawal Agreement). 2 The reason is that, because the UK left
the EU, Britons have lost their EU citizenship and the rights that attach
* The Hague University of Applied Sciences, The Hague, The Netherlands
There are somewhere between 1.3 and 2 million British nationals permanently resident

1.

in other EU member states. See S.O.S. FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, THE PROCESS
FOR WITHDRAWING FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2016, Cm. 9216, ¶ 4.2 (UK); Asa Bennett, What

Will Brexit Mean for British Expats?, TELEGRAPH (June 24, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2016/05/18/eu-facts-what-would-leaving-the-eu-mean-for-expats/
[https://perma.cc/9PMF
-6QTA].
2. See Council Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, Nov.
12, 2019, 2019 O.J. (C 384) 1 [hereinafter Withdrawal Agreement]; Rowena Mason, EU Citizens
in UK Face Brexit Uncertainty, THE GUARDIAN (May 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/
politics/2016/may/15/eu-citizens-uk-brexit-uncertainty-immigration-status-referendum
[https://
perma.cc/74J6-H4GY] (Lord Keen of Elie, advocate general for Scotland and government's home
affairs spokesman in the House of Lords, replied to a question in the House of Lords that "UK
citizens get the right to live and work in the other 27 member states from our membership of the
EU. If the UK voted to leave the EU, the government would do all it could to secure a positive
outcome for the country, but there would be no requirement under EU law for these rights to be
maintained.").
95
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to that .status. Chiefly among these rights is that EU 'citizens enjoy
freedom of movement and residence within the EU, protection against
discrimination on grounds of nationality, the right to vote in municipal
and European Parliament elections, and consular protection by any EU
member state. Without EU citizenship status, and without such rights,
Britons cannot reside in the EU unless they obtain burdensome
permission under domestic law. British nationals must now register as
foreign nationals, subject to the domestic immigration laws of various EU
member states and the provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement, prior to
differing deadlines as late as December 2021.3 After this deadline,the
status of British nationals in EU member states is presumably the same
as that of any other unlawfully present foreign national.
This Article, however, will challenge the assumption that UK
nationals have lost EU citizenship following Brexit because it amounts to
an arbitrary withdrawal of citizenship, prohibited by international law. In
turn, this Article argues that British nationals should continue to enjoy
the rights and status of EU citizens beyond the registration deadlines at
the end of 2021. The current public debate, and the Withdrawal
Agreement itself, assumes that loss of EU citizenship is the automatic
result of Brexit. Currently much of the discussion relies heavily on a
narrative informed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT) and general principles of international institutional law. These
sources are quite valid for discussing the membership of a state in an
international organization, but this narrative overlooks the law on human
rights that applies to individuals. This argument is based on the right
against arbitrary withdrawal of nationality in international law, and
the evolving nature of EU citizenship being assimilated to a
quasi-nationality.

3. See, e.g., FOREIGN COMMONWEALTH & DEVELOPMENT OFFICE, SPECIALISED COMMITTEE
ON CITIZENS' RIGHTS: TH[RD JOINT REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESIDENCE RIGHTS

UNDER PART 2 OF THE WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT (UK), https://www.gov.uk/govemment/
publications/residence-rights-implementation-of-the-withdrawal-agreement-part-2-citizens-

rights-third-joint-report-april-2021/specialised-committee-on-citizens-rights-thirdjoint-report-

on-the-implementation-of-residence-rights-under-part-2-of-the-withdrawal-agreement (reporting
registration deadlines in EU Member States ranging from June 30 to December 31, 2021); Living
in the Netherlands After Brexit, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALISATION SERVICE, https://ind.nI/en/
Pages/Living-in-the-Netherlands-after-Brexit.aspx [https://perma.cc/X3NN-FUJM] (last visited
Oct. 1, 2021); Living in the Netherlands Under the Brexit Agreement, IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALISATION

SERVICE,

https://ind.nl/en/Pages/Brexit-(UK-Withdrawal-Agreement).aspx

[https://perma.cc/QL5U-4WHV] (last visited Oct. 1, 2021) (reporting on the deadline in the
Netherlands of September 30, 2021).
In reaction to this potential change in status, at least one British national has already

challenged her loss of EU citizenship before the Court of Justice of the European Union, which
remains pending at the time of this Article. See Case C-673/20, EP v Prefet du Gers & Institut
National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (currently pending)
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Some scholars have argued that "since the UK insists that it can no
longer accept free movement, it cannot both have its cake and eat it. You
cannot be in the Single Market without accepting its cardinal principles." 4
Surely, it is correct that when a member state is no longer a member of
the EU that the benefits of the EU treaties no longer apply to its nationals.
While this conclusion may assert an argument that is just, it is not the
law. This Article will not challenge the right of the UK to leave the
EU. The Lisbon Treaty clearly provides a right for states to leave the EU
and necessarily lose all rights in the Union, such as participation in the
common market. Instead, this Article will argue that the exit of an EU
member state does not necessarily take its nationals with it.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP
A key question for this Article is whether EU citizenship benefits from
the same human rights protections that nationality enjoys under
international law. The first part of this Article will briefly discuss the
protection of nationality under international law.
The International Court of Justice considers nationality to be a "legal
bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection
of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of
reciprocal rights and duties." 5 While nationality has social and emotional
significance, as well as significance for an individual's identity, as far as
law is concerned nationality is reducible to a legal concept. 6 That concept
is one of a legal bond. That bond, in turn, grants an individual a status
that provides for certain rights and duties under the law.7
Nationality is primarily, and for the purposes of international law,
only, a legal status, although that statement is not meant to diminish the
important social, cultural, local, and linguistic ties.8 While it often
4. Joseph Weiler, The Case for a Kinder, Gentler Brexit, EJIL:TALK! (Feb. 6, 2017),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/editorial-the-case-for-a-kinder-gentler-brexit/#more-14969
[https://perma

.cc/DH5E-JPTB].
5. Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6) ("According to the
practice of States, to arbitral and judicial decisions and to the opinions of writers, nationality is a
legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence,
interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties."); ALBRECHT
RANDELZHOFER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

502 (3d

ed. 1997) ("Nationality

as a legal term denotes the existence of a legal tie between an individual and a State, by which the
individual is under the personal jurisdiction of that State.").
6. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on, the Work of its Fifth Session, ¶ 130, U.N. Doc.

A/CN.4/76 (1953);

CARMEN TIBURCIO, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS UNDER INTERNATIONAL

AND COMPARATIVE LAW 3

(2001).

7. See PAUL WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL

LAw

29 (2d

ed.

1979).
8. See JACK M. BARBALET, CITIZENSHIP 20 (1988); Audrey Macklin, Who is the Citizen's
Other? Consideringthe Heft of Citizenship, 8 THEORETICAL INQU[RIES L. 333, 334 (2007); Linda
Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 447, 452-89 (2000); David
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involves social links to the state, nationality or citizenship is essentially
9
the "juridical expression" of that social bond.
International law largely leaves questions of the acquisition and loss
of nationality to states, although increasing international law does present
0
some limitations to state discretion in this matter.1 For example,the
Permanent Court of International Justice famously stated that there was
no apriorireason that international law could not govern nationality law,
which would only depend on the state of the development of the law."
Although states have a wide range of discretion in how they award their
nationality, and other states will presume that the grant of nationality is
effective, 12 those acts of state do not necessarily have to be recognized
and given legal effect by other states, where those nationality grants are
3
.inconsistent with international law.1 International law also imposes
limitations on revocation of nationality, which are in fact more intrusive
4
into a state's discretion than any restrictions on nationality acquisition.'
Held, Between State and Civil Society: Citizenship, in CITIZENSHIP 20 (Geoff Andrews ed., 1991);
Michael Walzer, Citizenship, in POLITICAL INNOVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 211 (Terrence
Ballet et al. eds., 1989).
9. See Liech. v. Guat., 1955 I.C.J. at 23 ("[C]onstitute[s] the juridical expression of the
fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred ... is in fact more closely connected with the
population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State.").

&

10. See Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J.
(ser. B) No. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7); Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Advisory Opinion,
1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 10, at 19 (Feb. 21); Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization
Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A.) No. 4,1 58-63 (Jan. 19, 1984); Int'l Law Comm 'n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-First Session,
U.N. Doc. A/54/10 (1999), reprinted in [1999] I1(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 23, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1999/Add.1 [hereinafter Draft Articles on Nationality]; 1 ROBERT JENNINGS
ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 852-56 (9th ed. 2008); LASSA OPPENHEIM,

INTERNATIONAL LAW 642 (8th ed. 1955) ("Nationality of an individual is his quality of being a
subject of a certain State, and therefore its citizen. It is not for international law but for municipal
law to determine who is, and who is not, to be considered a subject"). See generally William
Thomas Worster, European Union Citizenship and the Unlawful Denial of Member State
Nationality, 43 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 767 (2020).

11. See Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at

24 ("The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is
an essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of international relations.").

12. See Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10, art. 4, cmt. 7.
13. See Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict ofNationality Laws art. 1,

Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter 1930 Hague Convention]; European Convention on
Nationality art. 7, Nov. 6, 1997, E.T.S. No. 166; Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and
Morocco, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24; Liech. v. Guat., 1955 I.C.J. at 22; Proposed
Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) No. 4, ¶T 52-68; John Dugard (Special Rapporteur), First Rep. on Diplomatic Protection,

U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/506 (Mar. 7, 2000).
14. See

1930 Hague Convention, supra note 13, art. 1; European Convention on

Nationality, supra note 13, art. 3(2); RUTH
INTERNATIONAL LAW 121-67 (2d ed. 1994).
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As far as human rights are concerned, everyone has a right to a
nationality that prevents his or her state from revoking their nationality
in an arbitrary, discriminatory manner.15 With the emergence of human
rights law in the post-World War II era, and the inclusion of the right to
a nationality in many major human rights treaties, the pendulum has
confidently swung away from state discretion and in favor of the
individual holding the right to a nationality. 16 Part of the reasoning for
the protection of nationality is that individuals have a "legitimate interest"
in their nationality, 7 and their nationality needs to be protected "as a
means for ensuring greater juridical security for States and for
individuals." 18 Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that
deprivation of nationality is such a fundamental infringement on the
security of the person that it requires "an overriding public interest and is

15. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 271 (Dec.
10, 1948); G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 12(4),

26 (Dec. 16, 1966); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123;
European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, art. 7; African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights art. 12(2), June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217; Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter Reduction of Statelessness]; Eri.-Eth.

Claims Comm'n - Partial Award: Civilian Claims - Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 and 27-32 (Eri.
v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 195 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2004) [hereinafter Eritrea's Claims]; Human Rights
Council Res. 32/5, U.N. Doc. A/71/53, at 176 (June 30, 2016); Human Rights Council Res. 26/14,

U.N. Doc. A/69/53, at 164 (June 26, 2014); Human Rights Council Res. 20/4, U.N. Doc. A/67/53,
at 141 (July 5, 2012); Human Rights Council Res. 20/5, U.N. Doc. A/67/53, at 143 (July 5, 2012);
Human Rights Council Res. 13/2, U.N. Doc. A/65/53, at 77 (Mar. 24, 2010); Human Rights
Council Res. 10/13, U.N. Doc. A/64/53, at 54 (Mar. 26, 2009); Human Rights Council Res. 7/10,
U.N. Doc. A/63/53, at 101 (Mar. 27, 2008); Human Rights Commission Res. 2005/45, U.N. Doc.
E/2005/23, at 187 (Apr. 19, 2005); Human Rights Commission Res. 1999/28, U.N. Doc.

E/1999/23, at 116 (Apr. 26, 1999); id ¶ 2; Human Rights Commission Res. 1998/48, U.N. Doc.
E/1998/23, at 160, ¶ 2 (Apr. 17, 1998); Human Rights Commission Res. 1997/36, U.N. Doc.
E/1997/23, at 122, ¶ 2 (Apr. 11, 1997); Yean & Bosico Children v. Dominican Republic,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130 (Sept. 8, 2005); U.N. Secretary-General, Human

Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, U.N. Doc. A/I-RC/25/28 (Dec. 19, 2013)
[hereinafter ArbitraryDeprivation of Nationality 2013 Report].
Furthermore, denial of nationality might even raise a violation of Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (the UK and all states of the EU are party, though the EU itself is
not) if it were to violate rights to family and private life (identity). See Ramadan v. Malta, App.

No.

76136/12,

¶ 62

(June

21,

2016),

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-163820

[https://perma.cc/5TCX-ERJF]; Genovese v. Malta, App. No. 53124/09, ¶ 30 (Oct. 11, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-106785 [https://perma.cc/XP3E-MS9S]; Savoia v. Italy,

App. No. 8407/05 (July 11, 2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-76690 [https://perma
.cc/5ZNY-54FH]; Slivenko v. Latvia, 2002-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. 467, 486; Karassev v. Finland,
1999-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 403.
16. See Ineta Ziemele & Gunnar G. Schram, Article 16, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 301-02 (Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbjon Eide eds., 1999) (describing the
debate over the inclusion and articulation of the right to a nationality in the Universal Declaration).

17. See Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10, pmbl., cmt. 5.
18. See id. pmbl.
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subject to proportionality."1 9 That being said, which state owes the
individual a nationality remains unclear, so this is how we see the residual
right to grant nationality being retained by states, so again, if the person
is a dual national, this protection may not be of any help.
The limitation on arbitrary revocation has two aspects: procedure and
substance. 2 0 The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has
recognized the restriction on arbitrary revocation of nationality as a
"general principle of international law"2 ' although it is unclear whether
the Court only views the procedural protection or also the substantive
protection as a part of that principle. Thus, a state must have a legal basis
for the revocation of nationality and provide for legal process to challenge
a revocation decision 2 2 but it must also have a legitimate aim that is
23
proportionate to an important state interest, even if it has the legal basis
24
and process. In this sense, we can say that the individual must have the
19. See Kay Hailbronner, Revocation of Citizenship of Terrorists: A Matter of Political
Expediency, in The Return of Banishment: Do the New DenationalisationPolicies Weaken

Citizenship?,23, 23 (Eur. Univ. Inst., Working Paper RSCAS 2015/14) ("It is true that citizenship
establishes a special relationship based upon security and stability. Security and stability on the
side of the individual citizen require that denationalisation remains a rare exception. Citizenship

implies rights, whether it is designated as a privilege, as a right to have rights or as a contract. For
that reason deprivation of citizenship requires an overriding public interest and is subject to
proportionality.").
20. See Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality 2013 Report, supra note 15, 1 40; U.N.
Secretary-General, Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/10/34 (Jan. 26, 2009).

21. See Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. 1-1449, 1-1489 ("That
conclusion is, moreover, in keeping with the general principle of international law that no one is

arbitrarily to be deprived of his nationality, that principle being reproduced in Article 15(2) of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in Article 4(c) of the European Convention on
nationality. When a State deprives a person of his nationality because of his acts of deception,
legally established, that deprivation cannot be considered to be an arbitrary act."); see also
European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, art. 4(c).
22. See European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, arts. 7, 12; id. Explanatory
Report, ¶ 36 (providing that denaturalization must be foreseeable, proportional and provided in
law); Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 74,195 (Feb. 6, 2001);
U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rights andArbitraryDeprivation of Nationality, 1 43-46, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/13/34 (Dec. 14, 2009); Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality 2013 Report, supra

note 15, ¶ 40; Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10, art. 17; Int'l Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Comment No. 27: Freedom of Movement (Article 12), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Freedom of Movement].
23. See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. v. It.), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. 15, ¶ 128 (July 20)

("Arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as something opposed to the

rule of law." (citing Asylum (Colom./Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 266, 284 (Nov. 20))); Eritrea's
Claims, supra note 15; Freedom of Movement, supra note 22, 1 21; see also Stewart v. Canada,

H.R.C. Views No. 538/1993, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993 (1996) (Evatt, Medina
Quiroga, & Aguilar Urbina, dissenting).
24. See Van Alphen v. Netherlands, H.R.C. Views No. 305/1988, ¶ 5(8), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988 (1990); A v. Australia, H.R.C. Views No. 560/1993, ¶ 9(2), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/59/D/560/1 993 (1997); Freedom of Movement, supra note 22; Maurice Kamto (Special
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right to retain their nationality and only lose it when they intend to do so
or when theycommit acts where the possibility of loss of nationality was
clearly predictable and proportionate to the act.
Historically some states have entered into treaties to dispose of their
nationals' nationality; 25 however, this practice has now essentially ended
and it is generally understood that individuals in, for example, transferred
territory, should have a choice in the change of their nationality. 26 For
example, the U.S. changed its practice to abolish revocation of nationality
upon extended residence abroad, 27 and then eventually also abolished all
revocation of nationality that is done against the wishes of the national. 28
However, choosing to retain the old nationality might mean that the
person must leave the ceded territory. In a recent example, India and
Bangladesh exchanged a great number of outstanding micro-enclaves.
Whereas in prior agreements that exchanged some enclaves, the
affected residents had to change their nationality to that of the new
state, 2 9 in the most recent agreement exchanging the remaining enclaves,
the affected individuals were given a choice of nationality. 30 We can
compare this emerging rule to the long standing rule against forcible
nationalization of residents or other persons over whom a state may wish
to extend its allegiance. 3 1
Rapporteur), Eighth Rep. on the Expulsion ofAliens, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/651 (Mar. 22, 2012); Int'l
Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, ¶¶ 35-45, U.N. Doc. A/69/10 (2014);
Hailbronner, supra note 19.
25. See Treaty of Rapallo, It.-Kingdom S.H.S., Nov. 12, 1920, 34 L.N.T.S 397; Legal and

Financial Convention, Czech-Czech., Apr. 23, 1925, 1926 L.N.T.S. 335; Convention Concerning
the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Greece-Turk., art. 7, Jan. 30, 1923, 32 L.N.T.S.
76 ("The emigrants will lose the nationality of the country which they are leaving, and will acquire
the nationality of the country of their destination, upon their arrival in the territory of the latter
country."); Treaty Concerning the Transcarpathian Ukraine, Czech-U.S.S.R., Protocol, art. II,
June 29, 1945, 1964 U.N.T.S. 310; Treaty, Pol.-U.S.S.R., July 6, 1945, Treaty, Pol.-U.S.S.R.,
Aug. 10, 1945, 10(II) U.N.T.S. 61 (1947); Communique Concerning the Agreement Between the
U.S.S.R. and Poland Relating to the Change of Nationality and Repatriation, reprintedin Soviet

News, Soviet-Polish Relations (1946); Berlin (Potsdam) Conference art. 12, 3 BEVANS 1224;
Dziennik Ustaw No. 106 (1946) (providing for Polish nationality for the inhabitants of the
annexed territory); Treaty of Peace, It.-U.S., arts. 19-20, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1245, 49 U.N.T.S.
3 (providing for nationality of persons in ceded territories).

26. See In re Rau, 6 I.L.R. 251, 251 (1930).
27. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1964).
28. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
29. See Border Agreement, Bangl.-India, May 16, 1974, reprinted in 20 FOREIGN AFFS.
REC. 158 (1974); Indo-Pakistan Agreement on East Pakistan Border Disputes, India.-Pak., Oct.
23, 1959, 362 U.N.T.S. 3; Joint Communique by P.M.s Nehru & Noon, Sept. 12, 1958, reprinted
in 28 FOREIGN AFFS. REC. 25 (1982).

30. See Suhasini Haidar, 90% of Enclave Dwellers Give Choice of Nation, THE HINDU
(July 16, 2015), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/90-of-enclave-dwellers-give-choice-ofnation/article7426638.ece [https://perma.cc/54NN-QVYM].
31. See DraftArticles on Nationality, supra note 10, art. 8(2) ("A successor State shall not
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In cases of state succession and the adoption of new nationality laws,
some people are at an increased riskof losing their nationality against
their will. The International Law Commission (ILC) dealt with this risk
by preparing DraftArticles on Nationality of NaturalPersons in relation
32
to the Succession of States to protect individuals' nationality.
Obviously, these articles cover situations of the emergence of new states,
33
merger of existing states, and the possible extinction of a prior one.
Where it does consider the secession of a state from another, the draft
articles provide that there is a presumption that nationalityand territory
run together, i.e. that a person acquires the nationality of the place of
34
usual residence upon that territory's change in character. But this
presumption can be rebutted based on the individual's right to opt for
35
nationality of the new or former state, because "the juridical relationship
of nationality should not be based on formality or artifice, but on a real
36
connection between the individual and the State." It is true that many
treaties in the past disposed of nationality, but the ILC identified the
dominant practice as providing for a right of option in those cases, as long
37
as the person maintained some connection to the state. This practice is
attribute its nationality to persons concerned who have their habitual residence in another State
against the will of the persons concerned unless they would otherwise become stateless."); id. art.
11(1) ("States concerned shall give consideration to the will of persons concerned whenever those
persons are qualified to acquire the nationality of two or more States concerned."); see also WEIS,
supra note 8, at 102.
32. Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10.

33. See DraftArticles on Nationality, supra note 10, pmbl.
34. See id. art. 5

35. See id. art. 5, cmt. 2
36. Id. art. 5, cmt. 4; see also 1 DANIEL P. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 518 (1967) ("the most satisfactory test"); Ian Brownlie, The
Relations of Nationality in Public InternationalLaw, 39 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 284, 318 (1963).
37. See generally Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10, art. 11, cmt. 2 (citing inter
alia Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty of

Versailles), June 28, 1919, 42 Stat. 1939, 225 Consol. T.S. 18891(2); Treaty of Peace Between

the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria, Sept. 10, 1919; Treaty Between the Principal

Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, June 28, 1919; Treaty Between the Principal Allied
and Associated Powers and Czechoslovakia, Sept. 10, 1919; Treaty Between the Principal Allied
and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Sept. 10, 1919; Treaty of Paris Between

the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Romania, Dec. 9, 1919; Treaty of Peace Between
the Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria, Feb. 10, 1947; Treaty of Peace Between the Allied
and Associated Powers and Hungary, June 4, 1920; Treaty of Peace Between Finland and the
Soviet Government of Russia, Oct. 14, 1920; Treaty of Peace, July 24, 1923; Treaty of Peace with
Italy, Feb. 10, 1947; Agreement Between India and France for the Settlement of the Question of
the Future of the French Establishments in India, Oct. 21, 1954; Treaty of Cession of the French

Establishments of Pondicherry, Karikal, Mahe and Yanam, India-Fr, May 28, 1956)).

For a more contemporary example, see e.g., Transfer of Walvis Bay to Namibia Act, Act No.

203 of 1993 (Jan. 28, 1994),

§ 5(1) (S. Afr.) (" ... any person who is ordinarily resident in Walvis

Bay and who immediately prior to the date of transfer was a South African citizen and elects to

retain South African citizenship, shall continue to be a South African citizen after that date, and
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in keeping with the evolution of human rights to view nationality and/or
citizenship as part of a person's identity, and thus protected by human
rights law. 38

Some jurisprudence has evolved to give more content to the
prohibition on arbitrary revocation. Substantive arbitrariness would
certainly include certain grounds of discrimination, 39 including race,4 0

such a person shall continue to be entitled to reside in Walvis bay.").
38. See Yean & Bosico Children v. Dominican Republic, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 130 (Sept. 8, 2005) (concluding that by not granting children nationality, the state

violates Article 8 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3); U.N. Secretary-General, Impact of the ArbitraryDeprivation of Nationality on the
Enjoyment ofthe Rights of Children Concerned, and ExistingLaws andPractices on Accessibility
for Children to Acquire Nationality, inter alia, of the Country in Which They Are Born, if They
Otherwise Would Be Stateless, U.N. Doc. A/IRC/31/29 (Dec. 16,2015); U.N. Secretary-General,

Status of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. A/68/257 (Aug. 2, 2013) 1 57.
39. See U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 123d mtg. at 352, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.123 (Nov. 5, 1948)
(Eleanor Roosevelt stated that "individuals should not be subjected to action such as was taken
during the nazi [sic] r6gime in Germany when thousands had been stripped of their nationality by
arbitrary government action").
40. See, e.g., Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 15, art. 9; International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5, adoptedDec. 21, 1965, T.I.A.S. No.
94-1120, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD]; European Convention on Nationality, supra

note 13, art. 5(1); Acquisition of Polish Nationality, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No.
7, at 15 (Sept. 15); H.R.C. Res. 20/5, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 13/2, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res.
10/13, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 7/10, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 2005/45, supra note 15;
H.R.C. Res. 1999/28, supra note 15; id. ¶2; H.R.C. Res. 1998/48, supra note 15, ¶ 2; H.R.C. Res.

1997/36, supra note 15, ¶ 2; Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10, art. 15.
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46
45
43
color,4 ' national origin,4 2 ethnicity, gender4 or sex, religion, social
52
51
5
49
origin 47 language, 4 8 property, birth or "other status," and politica
54
or "other opinion", 53 although this list is probably not exclusive. Other
arbitrary revocations are not necessarily based on discrimination. For

41. See, e.g., Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 15, art. 9; ICERD, supra note 40, art. 5;

European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, art. 5(1); Acquisition of Polish Nationality,
1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 7, at 15; H.R.C. Res. 20/5, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 13/2, supra note
15; H.R.C. Res. 10/13, supra note 15; DraftArticles on Nationality, supra note 10, art. 15.
42. See, e.g., Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 15, art. 9; ICERD, supra note 40, art. 5;

European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, art. 5(1); Acquisition of Polish Nationality,
1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 7, at 15; H.R.C. Res. 20/5, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 13/2, supra note
15; H.R.C. Res. 10/13, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 7/10, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 2005/45,
supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 1999/28, supra note 15; id. 12; H.R.C. Res. 1998/48, supra note 15,
¶2; H.R.C. Res. 1997/36, supra note 15,12; DraftArticles on Nationality, supra note 10, art. 15.
43. See, e.g., Reduction of Statelessness, supranote 15, art. 9; ICERD, supra note 40, art. 5;

European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, art 5(1); Acquisition of Polish Nationality,
1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 7, at 15; H.R.C. Res. 7/10, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 2005/45, supra

note 15; H.R.C. Res. 1999/28, supra note 15; id. ¶ 2; H.R.C. Res. 1998/48, supra note 15, 1 2;
H.R.C. Res. 1997/36, supra note 15, 1 2; Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10, art. 15.
44. See, e.g., H.R.C. Res. 7/10, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 2005/45, supra note 15; H.R.C.

Res. 1999/28, supra note 15; id.

¶ 2; H.R.C. Res. 1998/48, supra note 15, ¶ 2; H.R.C. Res.

1997/36, supra note 15, 1 2.
45. See, e.g., Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 15, art. 9; ICERD, supra note 40, art. 5;

European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, art. 5(1); Acquisition of Polish Nationality,
1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 7, at 15; H.R.C. Res. 20/5, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 13/2, supra note
15; H.R.C. Res. 10/13, supra note 15; DraftArticles on Nationality, supra note 10, art. 15.
46. See, e.g., Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 15, art. 9; ICERD, supra note 40, art. 5;

European. Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, art. 5(1); Acquisition of Polish Nationality,
1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 7, at 15; H.R.C. Res. 20/5, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 13/2, supra note
15; H.R.C. Res. 10/13, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 7/10, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 2005/45,
supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 1999/28,
¶ 2; H.R.C. Res. 1997/36, supra note
47. See, e.g., H.R.C. Res. 20/5,
10/13, supra note 15.
48. See, e.g., H.R.C. Res. 20/5,
10/13, supra note 15
49. See, e.g., H.R.C. Res. 20/5,

supranote 15; id. ¶ 2; H.R.C. Res. 1998/48, supra note 15,
15, ¶ 2; DraftArticles on Nationality, supra note 10, art. 15.
supranote 15; H.R.C. Res. 13/2, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res.
supranote 15; H.R.C. Res. 13/2, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res.
supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 13/2, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res.

10/13, supra note 15
50. See, e.g., H.R.C. Res. 20/5, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 13/2, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res.

10/13, supra note 15
51. See, e.g., H.R.C. Res. 20/5, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 13/2, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res.
10/13, supra note 15
52. See, e.g., H.R.C. Res. 10/13, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 7/10, supra note 15; H.R.C.
Res. 2005/45, supra note 15.

53. See, e.g., H.R.C. Res. 20/5, supranote 15; H.R.C. Res. 13/2, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res.

10/13, supra note 15.
54. See, e.g., Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 15, art. 9; ICERD, supra note 40, art. 5;

European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, art. 5(1); Acquisition of Polish Nationality,
Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 7, at 15 (Sept. 15); Draft Articles on Nationality,
supra note 10, art. 15 (prohibiting nationality discrimination "on any ground").
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example, according to the European Convention on Nationality,
revocation is only reasonable in the following situations: voluntary
acquisition of another nationality; acquisition of the nationality by fraud
or deception; voluntary service in a foreign military force; conduct
seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the state; lack of a genuine
link between the state and a national habitually residing abroad; or failure
of a child to fulfill preconditions established by law.55
These rules from human rights law limiting when a state may revoke
nationality bind both the UK and EU. 56 The EU is not formally party to
human rights treaties, 57 though it has committed itself to striving to
protect human rights, 58 perhaps including human rights protecting
nationality. Certainly the CJEU looks to treaties that the EU is not party
to, but which formed the inspiration for EU legislation, in interpreting EU
laws 59 and the EU has consented to the application of human rights
obligations to EULEX in Kosovo. 60 The EU is itself also bound to the
obligations of the EU member states when those member states transfer
their powers and duties to the EU. 6 1 The EU is additionally bound to
customary international human rights law, 62 which most likely includes
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights to nationality
55. See European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, art. 7(3) (limiting loss of
nationality); id. art. 5(1) (providing for grounds which are per se procedurally or substantively
arbitrary).
56. See generally Worster, supra note 10.

57. But see Council Decision 2010/48, 2010 O.J. (L 23) 35 (EC).
58. See Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen v. Oberburgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn,
2004 E.C.R. 1-9641, 1-9653 ("The Community legal order undeniably strives to ensure respect for
human dignity as a general principle of law. There can therefore be no doubt that the objective of
protecting human dignity is compatible with Community law.").

59. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-175, C-176, C-178 & C-179/08, Salahadin Abdulla v.
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2010 E.C.R. 1-1532, 1 (interpreting Article 78 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the EU and the EU Qualification Directive in harmony with the 1951 Refugee

Convention); Case C-31/09, Bolbol v. Bevandorlisi 6s Allampolgdrsdgi Hivatal, 2010 E.C.R.
1-5572, I; see also Council Directive 2004/83, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (EC); Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol Relating to the Status of

Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6233, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
60. See S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 11(j) (June 10, 1999) (establishing the United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and charging UNMIK with "[p]rotecting and
promoting human rights"); UNMIK Reg. No. 2006/12, On the Establishment of the Human Rights

Advisory Panel, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2006/12 (Mar. 23, 2006).
61. See, e.g., Joined Cases 21-24/72, Int'l Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit,

1972 E.C.R. 1220, 1227; Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. 11-3659, 11-3718; Case

T-306/01, Yusuf v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. 11-3544, 11-3620; see also Samantha Besson, European
Legal PluralismAfter Kadi, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REv. 237, 245 (2009); August Reinisch, Securing
the Accountability of InternationalOrganizations, 7 GLOB. GOVERNANCE 131, 137-38 (2001);
Pierre Pescatore, External Relations in the Case-Law of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 615, 637-38 (1979).
62. See Case C-308/06, Intertanko v. Sec'y of State for Transp., 2008 E.C.R. 1-4100,

1-4121.
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discussed herein, 63 especially non-discrimination.M Furthermore, general
principles of EU law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (CFR)6 5 contain an obligation to comply with
international law generally, 66 and could be understood to specifically
67
contain an obligation to comply with human rights. Thus, both the UK
and EU must comply with human rights law governing loss of nationality.
However, even if we agree that international human rights law binds the
EU, we still need to determine whether the EU has any citizenship law
that international law could impact.
II. EUROPEAN UNION CITIZENSHIP

Whatever EU citizenship is, there is no doubt that it is a new type of
status in international law, though it is still fundamentally a status of a
legal bond with the Union. And such a legal bond is the essential link that
is protected by human rights law protecting nationality.
68
EU citizenship is an unusual form of citizenship in international law.
69
EU citizenship was created by the treaties on European Union,
63. See Observance of Human Rights by States Which Are Not Parties to United Nations
Human Rights Conventions Additional Working Paper, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/2 (June 7,
2000); Observance of Human Rights by States Which Are Not Parties to United Nations Human
Rights Conventions Working Paper, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/29 (June 15, 1999); OSCAR
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

335-45 (1991); Hurst Hannum, The

J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 317-51 (1996);

.

Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA.
64. See Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion
OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶ 101 (Sept. 17, 2003).
65. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union arts. 6(1), 6(3), 9, Oct. 26,
2012, 2012

O.J.

(C 326) 13 [hereinafter TEU]; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European

Union art. 52(3), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 393 [hereinafter CFR]; Case C-130/10,
Parliament v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2012:472, ¶ 83 (July 19, 2012); Case C-400/10, J. McB. v.
L. E., 2010 E.C.R. I-8992, I-9012; Case C-479/04, Laserdisken ApS v. Kulturministeriet, 2006
E.C.R. 1-81 13, I-8129; Comm'n, Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External
Action - Towards a More Effective Approach, at 7, COM (2011) 886 final (Dec. 12, 2011).

66. See TEU, supra note 65, arts. 3(5), 21(3); Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union arts. 205, 207-08, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47
&

[hereinafter TFEU]; Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass'n Am. v. Sec'y of State for Energy

Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. 1-13833, 1-13885.
67. See TFEU, supra note 66, arts. 77, 214, 216; Case C-288/03 P, Zaoui v. Comm'n,

1113-15

(Oct.

14, 2004), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=

49666&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=st&dir=&occ-irst&part=l &cid=39464892; Case
C-352/98 P, Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA v. Comm'n, 2000 E.C.R. 1-5310,

1-5324-25.
IN THE
68. See THEODORA KOSTAKOPOULOU, CITIZENSHIP, IDENTITY AND IMMIGRATION

EUROPEAN UNION 94-98 (2001); Eleanor Spaventa, Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the
Scope of Union Citizenship and its Constitutional Effects, 45 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 13, 16-18

(2008).
69. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts art. 2(9), Nov. 10, 1997, 1997
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specifically the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, and later affirmed in the
CFR 70 and Council Directive 2004/38.71 It was also included in the
constitutional treaty, 72 although that instrument was ultimately not
adopted. The creation of a citizenship status by a supranational,
international organization along the lines of the EU is almost unique in
the world. 73 And yet, while the CJEU acknowledges that EU citizenship
is a status that is "beyond the State," 74 it is also "destined to be the
fundamental status of all nationals of the Member States." 75 Importantly,
it does not displace or replace member state nationality or citizenship, but
creates an additional citizenship. 76 As such, it is a status. It is distinct from
the rights and duties borne by EU citizens, though it is the prerequisite
to bear those rights and duties. 77 These rights include the right to vote
and stand for election in European and municipal elections. 78
Obviously, EU citizenship is labelled a "citizenship," rather than a
"nationality." Citizenship is generally understood to simply mean a
concept similar to nationality, though citizenship as a status falls under
domestic, not international law. For example, the U.S. distinguishes
O.J. (C 340) 1 ("Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national
citizenship."); TEU, supra note 65, art. 9 ("Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of
the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.");
TFEU, supra note 66, art. 20(1) ("Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person
holding the nationality of a Member State.shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union
shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.").
70. See CFR, supra note 65.

71. See Council Directive 2004/38, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77 (EC).
72. See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. 1-10(1), Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J.
(C 310) 1 ("Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the
Union shall be additional to national citizenship and shall not replace it.").

73. See Dora Kostakopoulou, European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future, 13 EUR.
L.J. 623, 624-25 (2007). The only comparable case is that of ECOWAS that created its notion of
a "community citizen". See Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS) art. 1, July 24, 1993, 2373 U.N.T.S. 233 (1996) ("'Community citizen or citizens'
means any national(s) of Member States who satisfy the conditions stipulated in the Protocol
defining Community citizenship"); ECOWAS Protocol A/P.3/5/82 Relating to the Definition of
Community Citizen art. 1 (May 29, 1982).
74. See id. ¶ 33 (citing Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. 1-1449,

I-1457).

75. See Case C-118/20, JY v. Wiener Landesregierung, ECLI:EU:C:2021:530, ¶ 33 (July
1, 2021) (citing Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-

la-Neuve, 2001 E.C.R. I-6193, 1-6242).
76. See TFEU, supra note 66, art. 20(1); Case C-224/98, D'Hoop v. Office national de
l'emploi, 2002 E.C.R. 1-6191, 1-6222; Case 836/18, Subdelegaci6n del Gobierno en Ciudad Real
v. RH, ECLI:EU:C:2020:119, ¶ 35 (Feb. 27, 2020); Case C-118/20, JY, ECLI:EU:C:2021:530,
133.
77. See TFEU, supra note 66, art. 20(2); Case C-118/20, JY, ECLI:EU:C:2021:530, ¶ 33.
78. See TFEU, supra note 66, art. 20(2); Case C-118/20, JY, ECLI:EU:C:2021:530, ¶ 33
(citing Case C-221/17, Tjebbes v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, ECLI:EU:C:2018:572, ¶ 38
(July 12, 2018)).
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under domestic law between nationals who are citizens and those who are
not, 79 although for all nationals and citizens, they would be considered to
have nationality for purposes of international law. Because it is a legal
status under domestic law, citizenship can give a right to vote or
participate in the political life of the state, although the status itself no
guarantee of any particular rights. 80 Thus under domestic law, it may be
the "right to have rights," 1 but under international law, nationality would
be the status of any person, citizen or not, with a legal bond to the state.
That being said, the terms "nationality" and "citizenship" are often used
82
interchangeably with the same meaning, and while there may be some
legal difference between domestic and international law, it is unclear
83
whether there is any difference soley under international law.
EU citizenship, while not identical to nationality, contains the same
essential conceptof a legal bond that is protected by international law on
nationality. This bond does not depend on the terms "national" or
"citizen" but on the substantive connection between the individual and
the international legal person. Nationality can also carry ethnic, cultural,
linguistic and/or historic significance and the EU member states likely
intended for EU citizenship to constitute a status distinct from member
state nationality. However, they were not completely clear whether EU

79. See 8 U.S.C. § 1408.
80. See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CFIZEN AND THE ALIEN 79 (2002); Sanja Ivic, EUCitizenship
as a Mental Construct: Reconstruction of PostnationalModel of Citizenship, 20 EUR. REV. 419,
419-37 (2012); Macklin, supra note 8, at 337; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF
CONSENT 54 (1975) ("Citizenship is a legal construct, an abstraction, a theory.... Emphasis on

citizenship as the tie that binds the individual to government and as the source of his rights leads

to metaphysical thinking about politics and law, and more particularly to symmetrical thinking,
to a search for reciprocity and symmetry and clarity of uncompromised rights and obligations,
rationally ranged one next to and against the other.... It is by such thinking . .. that the claims
of liberty may be readily translated into the postulates of oppression.").

81. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958); HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 226

(1951).
82. See Christopher McCrudden, Citizenship and Law: The Structure of the Green Paper
Identifying the Hallmarks of Citizenship, in HALLMARKS OF CITIZENSHI> 16 (J.P. Gardner ed.,
1994); Eur. Union Inst., Glossary on Citizenship and Electoral Rights, GLOB. CITIZEN
OBSERVATORY, https://globalcit.eu/glossary/ [https://perma.cc/GF9S-ABMS] ("Citizenship: A
legal status and relation between an individual and a state . .. that entails specific legal rights and
duties. Citizenship is generally used as a synonym for nationality .... ").
83. See WEIS, supra note 7, at 4-5 ("Conceptually and linguistically, the terms "nationality"
and "citizen-ship" emphasize two different aspects of the same notion: State membership.
Nationality stresses the international, citizenship the national, municipal aspect."). This Article
will not consider or discuss the French term ressortissant.See, e.g., Treaty of Peace Between the

Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Austria arts. 249, 256, Sept. 10, 1919, 226 Consol.
T.S. 8.
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citizenship was akin to nationality or citizenship in the legal meaning of
the term and it has been described as a form of dual nationality. 84
That being said, this author is not arguing that this status effectively
qualifies as nationality under international law generally, for example
for purposes of diplomatic protection. Instead, this author has confined
argument to concluding that, under European law, EU citizenship
qualifies as a sufficient legal bond between the individual and the Union
such that the Union and EU member states must apply the same
international law protections covering nationality. In fact, the CJEU has
apparently already agreed with this approach, as will be discussed in more
detail below.
III. ACQUISITION OF EU CITIZENSHIP

Before we discuss the rules on loss of EU citizenship and how those
rules might apply in the case of Brexit, we first need to consider the rules
on acquisition of EU citizenship in more detail. The European
Commission has noted that acquisition of EU citizenship is often
confusing for people. 85 The default rule in international law, where a state
has not adopted a law on nationality, is that all of the residents of the
territory at its independence are usually considered nationals. 86 While the
EU has not adopted citizenship laws per se, it has adopted a form of
citizenship law, so the default rule does not apply. The rule on acquiring
EU citizenship merely refers to the nationality laws of the EU member
states. Thus, the EU member state laws on nationality are the applicable
EU law on citizenship, insofar as they comply with EU law.

84. See-CaseC-224/98, D'Hoop v. Office national de l'emploi, 2002 E.C.R. I-6191, 1-6222;
Case C-836/18, Subdelegaci6n del Gobierno en Ciudad Real v. RH, ECLI:EU:C:2020:119, ¶ 35
(Feb. 27, 2020); Case C-118/20, JY v. Wiener Landesregierung, ECLI:EU:C:2021:530, ¶ 33 (July
1, 2021).
85. See Third Reportfrom the Commission on Citizenship of the Union, at 7, COM (2001)
506 final (Sept. 7, 2001) [hereinafter Third Citizenship Report] ("The Commission notes that
citizens do not always properly understand the link between citizenship of a Member State and
citizenship of the Union."); id. 7 n.4 ("The Commission receives a considerable number of letters
from people asking how they can become a citizen of the Union without first obtaining the
citizenship of a Member State."); see also the statement by Mr. Emil Scuka, President of the
International Union of Roma, at a press conference in the Italian Senate on Dec. 4, 2000 "The
proper citizenship for Roma living in Europe is European citizenship." (quoted in a report by
Agence France Presse).
86. See CLIVE PARRY, NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND

THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 355 (1957); see also AB v. MB, 17 I.L.R. 110 (DC TA 1951) (Isr.)
("So long as no law has been enacted providing otherwise, my view is that every individual who,
on the date of the establishment of the State of Israel was resident in the territory which today
constitutes the State of Israel, is also a national of Israel. Any other view must lead to the absurd
result of a State without nationals-a phenomenon the existence of which has not yet been

observed.").
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EU citizenship is dependent on member state nationality, but only for
purposes of acquisition. EU citizenship is acquired when a person has EU
member state nationality. 87 Thus, whether an individual acquires EU
member state nationality is primarily within the discretion of the member
state's nationality laws.8 8 In this way, it is dependent on having EU
member state nationality. 89 As such, there is an "independent" EU
90
citizenship that is nonetheless "linked" to EU member state nationality.
Interestingly it is not explicit in the treaties that a person holding
non-EU member state nationality automatically becomes an EU citizen
when his or her state of nationality joins the EU. It could be arguable
that the person originally acquired his or her state nationality, and as a
non-EU member state at the time, the person did not acquire EU
citizenship. After all, the EU treaties only provide for one mechanism for
receipt of EU citizenship when a person is holding EU member state
nationality. There is no mechanism for acquiring only EU citizenship at
a later time, separate from a grant of EU member statenationality. Simply
87. See TFEU, supra note 66, art. 20(1); Case C-165/14, Rend6n Mann v. Administraci6n

del Estado, ECLI:EU:C:2016:675, ¶ 107 (Feb. 4, 2016); Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano v. Office
national de l'emploi, 2011 E.C.R. 1-1 177, 1-1251; Case C-413/99, Baumbast v. Sec'y of State for
the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R 1-7091, 1-7165-66; Case C-224/98, D 'Hoop, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-6222;
Council Directive 2004/38, art. 2(1), 2004 0.J. (L 158) 77, 87 (EC); Comm'n, Fourth Report on
Citizenship of the Union, COM (2004) 695 final (Oct. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Fourth Citizenship
Report]; Reportfrom the Commission on Citizenship of the Union, COM (1993) 702 final (Dec.
21, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Citizenship Report].

88. See Denmark and the Treaty on European Union, annex 1 § A, 1992 O.J. (C 348) 1, 2
(EC); Case C-369/90, Micheletti v. Delegaci6n del Gobierno en Cantabria, 1992 E.C.R. 1-4239,

Case C-192/99, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't. ex parte Kaur, 2001
E.C.R. 1-1237, ¶ 19; 1993 Citizenship Report, supra note 87, at 2 ("wherever in the Treaty
establishing the European Community reference is made to nationals of the Member States, the
question whether an individual possesses the nationality of a Member State shall be settled solely
by reference to the national law of the Member State concerned."); Third Citizenship Report,
supra note 85, at 7 ("It is therefore worth pointing out that ... it is for each Member State to lay
down the conditions for acquiring and losing the nationality of that state."); Fourth Citizenship
Report, supra note 87, at 5 ("Without prejudice to the fact that the Member States alone remain
competent in the area of nationality laws, the Commission has presented its views on
naturalisation of legal migrants in the Communication on immigration, employment and
integration in 2003."); Comm'n, Fifth Report on Citizenship of the Union, COM (2008) 85 final
(Feb. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Fifth Citizenship Report]; S.O.S FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH

I-4262;

AFFAIRS, NOTE TO THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC CONCERNING A DECLARATION THE UNITED KINGDOM
REPLACING THE DECLARATION ON THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM "NATIONALS" MADE AT THE TIME
OF SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY OF ACCESSION OF 22 JANUARY 1972 BY THE UNITED KINGDOM TO

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 1982, Cmnd. 9062 (UK), https://treaties.fco.gov.uk/awweb/aw
[hereinafter NOTE ON THE TERM
[https://perma.cc/J98R-NDXB]
archive?item=79058
"NATIONALS"].

89. It has even been described as being "parasitic" on EU Member State nationality, see R

v: Sec'y of State of the Home Dep't [2013] QB 1008 [39] (UK).
90. See Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. 1-1449, 1-1488; Case
C-165/14, Renddn Marin, ECLI:EU:C:2016:675, 1 108.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol33/iss1/4

16

Worster: Brexit as an Arbitrary Withdrawal of European Union Citizenship

20211

BREXIT AS AN A RBflTARY

WITHDRAWAL OF EUROPEAN UNION C7IZENSHIP

111

put, it could be argued that once a person received his non-EU member
state nationality (at birth or naturalization), he or she missed the chance
to get EU citizenship, notwithstanding his or her state's later accession to
the EU. However, this interpretation has not been followed in practice, so
when a state joins the EU, that state is considered an EU member state
and, as its nationals are now nationals of an EU member state, they are
also EU citizens. 9 1 However, it is important to observethat this is a case
of a person acquiring EU citizenship separately from the acquisition of
member state nationality, because the grant of EU citizenship is not
retroactive to the date of acquiring the EU member state nationality. In
this way, EU citizenship and member state nationality are severable to a
limited degree in this situation.
Despite referring to domestic law on EU member state nationality to
identify the accrual of EU citizenship, the CJEU has held that there are
limits to the exclusive application of domestic law. For example dual
nationals EU/non-EU cannot be prohibited from enjoying EU rights
under domestic law. 9 2 In addition, as will be discussed in more detail in
the next section, in revoking member state nationality, there may be
consequences for an individual's EU citizenship so the member state
must take EU law into consideration in applying its nationality laws. 93
However, in terms of acquisition of EU citizenship, EU law respects a
very wide margin of appreciation for member state rules for acquisition
of nationality, and EU citizenship follows the member state's laws. 94
An extreme example of the state discretion in acquisition of EU
citizenship is that EU member states may prohibit some of their nationals
from acquiring EU citizenship. EU member states have withheld EU
citizenship from some of their nationals who have a long-standing
connection to an overseas territory, 9 5 although generally these persons
91. See, e.g., S. Juz. Cont. Adm., July 10, 2008 (R.J., No. 11548/2004) (Spain) (concerning
the status of Romanian nationals following the accession of Romania to the EU in January 2007).
92. See Case C-200/02, Zhu v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2004 E.C.R. I-9925,

I-9968 (citing Case C-369/90, Micheletti, 1992 E.C.R. at 1-4262).

93. See Case C-135/08, Rottmann, 2010 E.C.R. at 1-####.
94. See id. at I-1488; Case C-192/99, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't. ex
parte Kaur, 2001 E.C.R. I-1237, ¶¶ 19-27. Note, however, that acquisition of EU member state
nationality and EU citizenship may enjoy stronger protection in situations comparable to the
pending case of JY. See Case C-118/20, JY v. Wiener Landesregierung, ECLI:EU:C:2021:530,1

53-67 (July 1, 2021) (recommending the Court to protect EU citizenship rights when the
individual was induced to renounce the nationality of one EU member state on assurances that
another EU member state would grant nationality).
95. See NOTE ON THE TERM "NATIONALS," supra note 88 ("British citizens ... [and p]ersons
who are British subjects by virtue of Part IV of the British Nationality Act 1981.").
Also note that the UK excluded certain EU citizenship rights from UK nationals in Jersey,
Guernsey and Man who are EU citizens, but do not have the right to free movement. This was
only possible because the exclusion was included in the EU treaties and those persons never
acquired the rights in the first place. It would be quite a different matter for the UK to attempt to
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96
may not have a status that international law understands as nationality.
However, member states may change and redefine which persons are
"nationals" under its nationality law are thus not to be considered
"nationals" for purpose of EU citizenship. For example, persons with a
link to a British dependent territory are considered UK nationals for
purposes of international law. 97 Upon its accession to the EU (then the
European Community) in 1972, the UK submitted a special declaration,
revised in 1981, that defined who qualified as a British national for
purposes of the EU. 9 8 Because of this act, "British Dependent Territories
Citizens," "British Overseas Territories Citizens," "British Subjects
without Citizenship," and "British Protected Persons" did not become
EU citizens despite international law (and UK law for certain purposes)
treating them as nationals.9 9 In 2002, some British Overseas Territories
Citizens (excepting those British Overseas Territories Citizens with a
connection to the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia)
received a change in status to British citizen and thus acquired EU
citizenship. 00 Curiously enough, it is possible for a British Citizen by
virtue of being a British Overseas Territories Citizen, to renounce British
citizenship and retain British Overseas Territories Citizenship, and in so
doing renounce EU citizenship as well.10' Interestingly enough, this
means that British nationals, until Brexit, were defined exclusively in

revoke those rights. See TFEU, supra note 66, art. 355(5)(c) ("the Treaties shall apply to the
Channel Islands and the Isle of Man only to the extent necessary to ensure the implementation
of... the European Economic Community and . .. the European Atomic Energy Community").

96. See Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4, 22-23 (Apr. 6).
See LAURIE FRANSMAN, FRANSMAN'S BRITISH NATIONALITY LAW 57 (3d ed. 2011);
CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 519 (Oxford Univ.

97.

JAMES

Press ed., 9th ed. 2019) ("In the case of the UK, the position is that the inhabitants of
dependencies, whatever their internal status under the British Nationality Act 1981, are considered
to have the status of national for purposes of international law.").
98. See NOTE ON THE TERM "NATIONALS," supra note 88; Andrew C. Evans, Nationality
Law and the Free Movement of Persons in the EEC: With Special Reference to the British

NationalityAct 1981, 2 Y.B. EUR. L. 173, 174 (1982).
99. See

GERARD-RENE

DE

GROOT,

STAATSANGEHORIGKEITSRECHT

IM

WANDEL

[CITIZENSHIP LAW IN TRANSITION] 103, 408 (1989).

100. See British Nationality Act 1981, c. 61 (UK); British Overseas Territories Act 2002,
c. 8 (UK); TFEU, supra note 66, art. 355(5)(b) ("the Treaties shall not apply to the United
Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus except to the extent necessary
to ensure the implementation of the arrangements set out in the Protocol on the Sovereign Base

Areas of the United Kingdom"); id. art. 355(5)(c) ("the Treaties shall apply to the Channel Islands
and the Isle of Man only to the extent necessary to ensure the implementation of. . . the European
Economic Community and ... the European Atomic Energy Community"). This example would

be a separate. instance where a person receives EU citizenship independently of his or her
acquisition of nationality.
101. See British Nationality Act 1981, c. 61 (UK); British Overseas Territories Act 2002,
c. 8 (UK).
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terms of EU law.' 0 2 In addition to the UK example, there are other
member state examples, 103 such as the exclusion of Danish nationals with
a connection to the Faeroe Islands,104 who also never acquired EU
citizenship along similar lines as the UK's approach. This degree of
discretion has been found to be acceptable, 10 5 after all, until a person
holds EU citizenship, he or she might not enjoy the same rights and
protections, including protection against loss of EU citizenship, as EU
citizens. Thus, in the area of acquisition of EU citizenship, the member
states retain considerable freedom.
In any event, holding EU member state nationality is the only way to
acquire EU citizenship as EU law does not explicitly provide for any other
mechanism. 06 It would be interesting if the EU ever were to attemptto
grant EU citizenship to any person not a member state national, perhaps
in the way that some peopleare naturalized (or made honorary nationals)
by parliaments, but for now acquisition is limited to cases where
individuals hold EU member state nationality.
IV. LOSS OF EU CITIZENSHIP

While the member states retain a wide degree of discretion in rules on
acquisition of nationality, EU law does limit states' ability to remove
nationality. First, EU law has no express terms on loss of EU citizenship.
Many authorities have concluded that EU citizenship is therefore fully
linked to member state nationality and an individual acquires and retains
EU citizenship only for so long as he or she retains EU member state
nationality.1 07 But this requirement is not explicitly indicated in the EU
102.

See NOTE ON THE TERM "NATIONALS," supra note 88.

103. See Staatsangeh6rigkeitsgesetz [Citizenship Act], July 22, 1913, RGBL at 538, as
amended Aug. 12, 2021, BGBL I at 3538 (Ger.). The effect of this law is that ethnic Germans in
Eastern Europe, not only East Germany, were deemed to be German nationals under the German
Constitution [Grundgesetz] art. 116, and thus EU citizens. This provision was never revoked but
its impact ceased to have significant practical effect after the reunification of Germany and the
admission of many East European states into the EU. This example would be yet another situation
where a person received EU citizenship separately from acquisition of his or her nationality.
104. See TFEU, supra note 66, art. 355(5)(a) ("the Treaties shall not apply to the Faeroe

Islands").
105. See Case C-192/99, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't. ex parte Kaur,
2001 E.C.R. 1-1237, ¶¶ 19-27. We might even wonder how far this discretion goes in deciding
which nationals receive EU citizenship. Presumably an EU member state could not discriminate
for nationality acquisition on grounds of race, for example, but finding a precise legal basis for
this argument is difficult. Additionally, the EU might not even have the competence to review this
decision.
106. See Third Citizenship Report, supra note 85, at 7 ("[T]here is no separate way of
acquiring citizenship of the Union. Nationality of a Member State is the only way to acquire

citizenship of the Union.").
107. See TFEU, supra note 66, art. 20(1); Third Citizenship Report, supra note 85, at 7
("Citizenship of the Union, as commentators have pointed out, is thus something 'superimposed'
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treaties, so it is admittedly an interpretation of the provision that an
individual has EU citizenship when he or she "hold[s]" member state
nationality. As a result, the rules on loss of EU citizenship have largely
followed the rules on loss of member state nationality.
Curiously there does not appear to be any possibility of renouncing
EU citizenship, despite renunciation of nationality being generally
considered a fundamental right across most nations in the world. 108 Most
likely the negotiators of the Treaties on European Union never
contemplated that any person would ever want to renounce EU
citizenship. As a result, it does not appear possible to renounce EU
citizenship without also renouncing EU member state nationality. It
might be desirable to eventually provide for this option, in order to
respect the fundamental freedom to renounce. In any event, the only
currently available method for an individual to renounce EU citizenship
is to renounce EU member state nationality as well.
Notwithstanding the fact that EU citizenship follows EU member state
nationality, the CJEU has recognized a difference between situations of
acquisition and loss of nationality,"' in line with the same difference in
treatment under human rights law. Acquisition, on the one hand, is a
gate-keeping function, where an individual's connection to the state is
0
assessed and, if sufficient, the status of nationality is granted." But the
status is not understood to be-lost the moment the sufficient connection
lapses. The reason is that, as discussed above, loss of nationality follows
different rules from acquisition.
The CJEU has followed the same approach to loss of nationality under
international human rights law in cases of loss of EU citizenship under
EU law. CJEU determined that, prior to acquiring EU citizenship, an
individual has no EU rights protecting the acquisition of EU
citizenship."' Thus, in ex parte Kaur, the CJEU easily dismissed the
individual's claim to a right to EU citizenship. However, once EU
on national and in some cases regional or local citizenship to give the effect of multiple levels.");

Case C-165/14, Rend6n Marin v. Administraci6n del Estado, ECLI:EU:C:2016:675, 1 107 (Feb.
4, 2016); Kay Hailbronner, Nationality in Public International Law and European Law, in
AcQuIsITION AND Loss OF NATIONALITY 37 (Rainer Baub6ck ed., 2006).
108. See, e.g., William Thomas Worster, The Constitutionalityof the Taxation Consequences
for Renouncing U.S. Citizenship, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 921, 967 (2010); William Thomas Worster,
Human Rights Law and the Taxation Consequencesfor Renouncing Citizenship, 62 ST. Louis U.

L.J. 85 (2017).
109. See Case C-192/99, ex parte Kaur, 2001 E.C.R. at ¶¶ 19-27; Case C-135/08, Rottmann
v. Freistaat Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. I-1449, 1-1488; Case C-369/90, Micheletti v. Delegaci6n del
Gobierno en Cantabria, 1992 E.C.R. 1-4239, 14262; Pham v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't
[2015] UKSC 19, [45] (appeal taken from Eng.).
110. See Draft Articles on Nationality, supra note 10, art. 5; O'CONNELL, supra note 36;
Brownlie, supra note 36.

111. See Case C-192/99, ex parte Kaur, 2001 E.C.R. at ¶ 19-27.
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citizenship has been acquired, the individual does accrue EU rights and
enjoys some protection of EU citizenship." 2 In Rottmann, the CJEU
limited the state's discretion in nationality laws, one of the "last bastions
of state sovereignty."' 1 3 The CJEU held that EU member states must take
the loss of EU citizenship into consideration when depriving a national
of member state nationality, and thus the deprivation must be
proportionate.11 4 Removal of nationality resulting in termination of EU
citizenship must serve a legitimate purpose,"1 5 be proportionate, 1 6 and
not be arbitrary," 7 the same or similar tests as applied to loss of
nationality in human rights law. Thus, the Rottmann judgment did not
prohibit Mr Rottmann's denationalization entirely,"1 8 after all, he was
ultimately successfully deprived of his nationality by the member state
despite the CJEU judgment, " 9 but the principle in the case is that member
state denationalization must be subjected to this additional standard, and
is not entirely within the discretion of the member state. In addition, to
the degree to which EU citizenship may form a part of a person's
identity,1 2 0 and the EU certainly promotes the development of a European
identity,121 revocation of EU citizenship may impact human rightsj 2 2
112. See Case C-135/08, Rottmann, 2010 E.C.R. at 1-1488; Appl. No. 37/2010, Republic v.
Nimal Jayaweera, Supreme Court (July 10, 2014) (Cyprus) (accepting, but reaffirming that
Rottmann only applied to loss of nationality, not acquisition of nationality).
113. See Sandra A. Mantu, Case C-135/08 Janko Rottman v FreistaatBayern: The End of
Nationality Legislation as We Know It?, 24 J. IMMIGR. ASYLUM & NAT'Y L. 182, 191 (2010).

114. See Case C-135/08, Rottmann, 2010 E.C.R. at 1-1488.
115. See id. at1-1489.
116.. See id. at 1-1489-90.
117. See id. at I-1489.
118. See UfR 211/2015 H, Publ. Pros. v. T ["Bookseller from Bronshej"], No. 211/2015
Hejesteret [Sup. Ct.] (June 8, 2016) (Den.) (revoking nationality, though without considering
Rottmann).
119. See Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court], Nov. 11,

2010, S C 12.10, https://www.bverwg.de/en/I I111

0U5C12.10.0 [https://perma.cc/Y5R9-3PZF]

(Ger.) (finding deprivation was proportionate, the fraud was very serious and even if he became
stateless, he still retained the right to live in Germany based on marriage to a German national
and Rottmann should be able to recover Austrian nationality which brings EU citizenship, and he
excessively delayed requesting confirmation from the Austrian authorities).

120. See Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:7, 161 (Jan.
14, 2015) (arguing that "a clearly understood, open, attitude to EU law should in the medium and
long term give rise, as a principle, to basic convergence between the constitutional identity of the
Union and that of each of the Member States.").
121. See Fifth Citizenship Report, supra note 88, at 4 ("Citizens should be made aware of

their European citizenship, its benefits as well as its rights and obligations, if they are to develop
a sense of European identity and give their full support to European integration."); Case C-165/14,

Renddn Marin, ECLI:EU:C:2016:675,

¶ 108 ("The fact that those rights have been recognised in

the case-law of the Court has played a major, even a decisive, role in the construction of this

fundamental status which, today, forms an essential part of the European identity enjoyed by
citizens.").
122. Case C-221/17, Tjebbes v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, ECLI:EU:C:2019:189, ¶
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including those protected by the European Convention on Human
Rights, 12 3 and thus also be limited.
Thus, the distinction between Kaur and Rottmann is the difference in
treatment of acquisition and loss of nationality, and the protection of
accrued EU citizenship. 12 4 It is true that some cases of loss of nationality
do not appear to follow this distinction. For example, some courts have
held that in case of nationality invalidation that is to say, the cancellation
of the original grant of nationality due to fraud, the individual never
actually acquired the EU member state's nationality and never acquired
EU citizenship. Thus, the denationalization principles in Rottmann did
not apply.' 2 5 Such a case is therefore not truly one of revocation of
nationality. Also, in a case where a person renounced his or her EU
member state nationality as a precondition to acquiring a different EU
member state nationality, the CJEU found that the acquisition of
26
nationality must give due consideration to EU law.1 The JY case is still
pending before the CJEU, but the Advocate General's opinion did not
focus on protecting the acquisition of EU citizenship, but on protecting
the individual from the loss of EU citizenship. As such, these cases do
follow the distinction between acquisition and loss. It is true that the
Rottmann case concerned fraudulently acquiring German nationality, but
the case was not viewed as a matter of acquisition because Rottmann
initially had Austrian nationality and therefore already had EU
27
citizenship, which deserved protection.1 Interestingly, the courts of
Germany have held that Rottmann protections applied even when the
12 8
previously renounced nationality was not that of an EU member state
and the courts of the UK and Latvia have also upheld the requirement
under EU law that a nationality revocation is proportionate without

45 (Mar. 12, 2019).
123. See Genovese v. Malta, App. No. 53124/09, 1¶ 30-33 (Oct. 11, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-106785 [https://perma.cc/JW56-H5KX] (This consideration
will take on added weight should the EU become a party to the ECHR. Of course, the UK is
already a party to the ECHR).

124. See Case C-135/08, Rottmann, 2010 E.C.R. at 1-1488; Case C-221/17, Tjebbes v.
Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, ECLI:EU:C:2019:189, ¶ 40-41 (Mar. 12, 2019).
125. See HR 25 mei 2012, NJ 2012, 337 m.nt. GRDG (Verzoekers/de Staat der Nederlanden)
(Neth.); HR 21 februari 2014, RvdW 2014, 374 m.nt. GRDG (Verzoekers/de Staat der

Nederlanden) (Neth.).
126. See Case C-118/20, JY v. Wiener Landesregierung, ECLI:EU:C:2021:530,
(July 1, 2021).

¶ 53-67

127. See Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court], Nov. 11,

2010, 5 C 12.10, https://www.bverwg.de/en/I 11 110U5C12.10.0 [https://perma.cc/YHM7-JQ4P]
(Ger.).
128. See Verwaltungsgericht [VG] Sigmaringen [Administrative Trial Court Sigmaringen],
July 20, 2011, 1 K 1752/10, https://openjur.de/u/357322.html

[https://perma.cc/482P-7NH5]

(Ger.).
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needing to specifically rely on Rottmann.1 29 These views reaffirm that
human rights law also apply to loss of nationality. In any event, the
critical point is to identify whether the case is one of acquisition or loss
of EU citizenship, and apply human rights protections to limit that loss.
The last question in this section is whether loss of EU member state
nationality or EU citizenship must always have an effect on the other, or
whether there is some possibility for separating the two statuses in cases
of loss of one or the other. If EU citizenship is to be protected from loss
to the same degree as member state nationality, yet still respect state
sovereignty over its nationality, then there is potential for EU citizenship
to detach from member state nationality. With such strong protections,
loss of EU citizenship cannot simply follow automatically from loss of
member state nationality.
There is some practice where EU citizenship and member state
nationality can be severed. In the section above, this Article discussed the
implied interpretation of the terms on EU citizenship to provide forthe
automatic granting of EU citizenship to non-EU member state nationals
when their state joins the EU. This process is, strictly speaking, a different
form and moment of acquisition of EU citizenship than provided in the
Treaties on European Union because the individual is not also acquiring
EU member state nationality at the same time. The two statuses are not
necessarily linked in acquisition in such a case, but instead nationality in
a state that joins the EU is a trigger for acquisition of EU citizenship at
the moment the state joins the Union.
Following from this instance of severing the two statuses, this Article
is examining the opposite scenario: when a state leaves the EU. Here as
well there are no express terms in the Treaties providing for automatic
change in citizenship status, and we simply assume that once the EU
citizen's state leaves the EU, his or her EU citizenship terminates at the
moment the state leaves. The EU treaties simply say that a person
acquires EU citizenship when a person "hold[s]" EU member state
nationality.1 30 It does not necessarily imply that a person loses EU
citizenship when the person no longer continuously "holds" EU member
state nationality. The reasoning of Rottmann does seem to contain an
assumption that the loss of EU member state nationality necessarily
results in loss of EU citizenship, and thus that the two statuses are
129. See Pham v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2015] UKSC 19, [45] (appeal taken
from Eng.) (accepting proportionality as measure for judicial review of revocation process); In re

NK, Lieta Nr. C03058707, Latvijas Republikas Augstakas tiesas [Sup. Ct.], Mar. 4, 2013) (Lat.).
130. See TFEU, supra note 66, art. 20(1); Case C-224/98, D'Hoop v. Office national de

l'emploi, 2002 E.C.R. 1-6191, I-6222; Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de
l'emploi, 2011 E.C.R. 1-1177, 1-1251; Case C-165/14, Rend6n Marin v. Administraci6n del
Estado, ECLI:EU:C:2016:675, ¶ 107 (Feb. 4, 2016); Case C-413/99, Baumbast v. Sec'y of State
for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R 1-7091, 1-7165-66.
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inseparable. Such an interpretation of the Treaties might not be
persuasive. As we have seen, acquisition and loss have differing
standards and requirements. Since EU citizenship is a "fundamental
status" producing a direct political and legal link between the individual
and EU, the rather drastic consequence of loss of EU citizenship cannot
be so easily implied into the EU treaties without stronger controlling
language. In any event, Rottmann only demanded that when a member
state's nationality laws impacted EU citizenship, EU law was relevant.
Furthermore, the same analysis announced in Rottmann would
prohibit an EU member state from continuing to respect the individual's
member state nationality but only revoking that person's EU citizenship
unilaterally. After all, according to Rottmann, any loss of EU citizenship
"falls, by reason of its nature and its consequences, within the ambit of
EU law,"' 3 1 and such an act would undoubtedly have the same impact on
EU rights that the CJEU contemplated in Rottmann. First, it is doubtful
that a member state even has the competence to revoke the EU citizenship
of one of its nationals on its own initiative. Second, the CJEU in
Zambrano held that EU law prohibits any measures that have the effect
of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the
32
If EU citizenship is a
substance of the rights conferred by the Treaty.
fundamental status that creates a legal bond between the personand the
Union, and the Union does not cease to exist, then it is difficult to
understand how a state could revoke the EU citizenship against the will
of the person.
Directive 2004/38 might also be read to suggest that EU citizenship
must be lost upon loss of member state nationality. The Directive states
that "[fjor the purpose of this Directive . . 'Union citizen' means any
33
However, just as
person having the nationality of a Member State."1
Firstly, the
correct.
with Rottmann, this conclusion is also not necessarily
definition in the Directive is not actually accurate as there are some
nationals of member states that do not acquire EU citizenship, for
example, the people of the Faroe Islands.13 When we have conflict
between a directive and the Treaty on European Union (TEU), obviously,
we defer to the TEU.' 3 5 Furthermore, it is indeed correct that a person
131. See Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. 1-1449, 1-1487; Case
C-165/14, Rend6n Marnn v. Administraci6n del Estado, ECLI:EU:C:2016:675, ¶ 114 (Feb. 4,
2016).
132. See Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l'emploi, 2011 E.C.R. I-1177,
I-1252; Case C-165/14, Renddn Marin, ECLI:EU:C:2016:675, ¶ 114 ("In my view, 'depriving
citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by their status as Union
citizens' corresponds to 'the nature and consequences of the loss of the status of citizen."').

133. See Council Directive 2004/38, art. 2(1), 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77, 87 (EC).
134. See TFEU, supra note 66, art. 355(5)(a) ("the Treaties shall not apply to the Faeroe
Islands").
135. See TFEU, supra note 66, arts. 263-67, 288, 290-91; Case C-84/94, UK v Council Eur.
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must have member state nationality in order to be a Union citizen, but
just as with the terms in the Treaties on European Union, the Directive
does not state that this test is applied continuously. It does not say that a
Union citizen is only a citizen for as long as he retains member state
nationality. And it certainly does not contemplate the scenario where the
individual continues to hold the EU member state nationality and yet the
member state ceases to be a member of the EU.
In the alternative, member states might seek to revoke EU citizenship
by treaty with the EU and/or its other member states. However, such a
practice would still be problematic. Any such agreement revoking EU
citizenship arbitrarily would clearly violate human rights law if it was
arbitrary and/or disproportionate.
Interestingly this conclusion has already been suggested to some
degree in the differing treatment of the Danish territories of the Faeroe
Islands and Greenland.1 36 Inhabitants of the Faeroe Islands hold Danish
nationality but from the founding of the EU, the Faroe Islands were
excluded from the Union in the Danish accession treaty, 137 so the
Faeroese, even though holding member state nationality, never acquired
EU citizenship. This outcome is acceptable since this is a case of
acquisition where member states have considerable discretion. To the
contrary, Greenland nationals are also Danish nationals but, in this case,
the territory was considered as Danish territory joining the EU. As such,
the territory became EU territory and Greenlanders acquired EU
citizenship.. When Denmark later withdrew Greenland from EU territory
and reclassified it with a new status in association. with the Union,
Greenlanders continued to enjoy EU citizenship. 13 8 Admittedly, the
agreement reclassifying Greenland's status did not specifically attempt to
revoke EU citizenship for those individuals.1 3 9 However, this precedent
Union

¶ 37, 84 (annulling art. 5 of Council Directive 93/104/EC (Nov. 23, 1993), OJ 1993 L 307,

18 on grounds of lack of a legal basis in the EC Treaty); Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12,
Digital Rights Ireland v Min. Comms, Marine & Nat. Res.; Karntner Landesregierung, Seitlinger,

Tschohl & Others, 1 69 (annulling Directive 2006/24 (Mar. 15, 2006), OJ 2006 L 105, 54, on
grounds of violating the CFR).
136. When Algeria seceded from France in 1962 it left the European Community, as it was
known at the time. This process occurred before the creation of the European Union and before
the creation of EU citizenship. See THE PROCESS FOR WITHDRAWING FROM THE EUROPEAN
UNION,
supra note 1, 13 n.3.
137. See TFEU, supra note 66, art. 355(5)(a) ("the Treaties shall not apply to the Faeroe

Islands").
138. See Gerard-Rend de Groot, Zum Verhaltnis der Unionsburgerschaft zu den
Staatsangehorigkeiten in der Europdischen Union [On the Relationship Between Union
Citizenship and Nationalitiesin the European Union], in EUROPMSCHES INTEGRATIONSRECHT IM

QUERSCHNITT

73 (Peter-Christian Muller-Graff ed., 2002).
139. See Treaty Regarding Greenland, supra note 95; LOV nr [Law Number] 21117 af

11.10.1972 om Danmarks tiltradelse af De europwiske Fwllesskaber Bilag

1 til loven: Akt

vedrorende tiltrodelsesvilkf.rene og tilpasningeme af traktaterne Protokoller til Tiltredelsesakten

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

25

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 4

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

120

[Vol. 33

shows that a change in the status of the territory should not impact the
continued enjoyment of EU citizenship.
From the foregoing, just because a state leaves the EU, it does not
necessarily follow that the EU citizens must automatically lose their EU
citizenship. Surely the state no longer exists in an EU relationship, but
that change does not necessarily affect individuals, especially considering
their fundamental EU citizen status and human rights on loss of
nationality. One important observation is that it is acceptable under the
EU citizenship regime for a territory to be outside the EU and yet for the
residents of that territory to hold EU citizenship. This conclusion is
perhaps not surprising in that many persons resident outside of the EU
also
may have EU citizenship. Many nationals of Latin American states
4 0 What is
citizenship.1
EU
hold Spanish or Italian nationality, and thus
different in the case of Greenland is for all of the residents of a specific
territory, which is not EU territory to hold EU citizenship and have rights
to reside in the EU, but this is not unique. It is also true for Dutch citizens
4 1 as
with a link to the territories of the Dutch Kingdom in the Caribbean,1
4 2 These
well as French citizens with a link to French overseas territories.1
territories are outside of the EU, andyet all of the residents of those
territories are EU citizens. Perhaps we do not consider these cases
important because the numbers of EU citizens in those territories are not
significant compared to the number of EU citizens overall, but in any
event, these cases are well founded in EU law. Thus, there would be
precedent for a territory to be outside the EU and yet for its nationals to
retain EU citizenship, the only appreciable difference in that case being
the sheer numbers of EU citizens in a non-EU territory.
Again, if we keep in mind that Union citizenship is meant to be a
fundamental status, it seems harder to understand how it can be so easily
lost as an automatic consequence of loss of member state nationality
without the consent of the person concerned. Surely there must be some
Protokol nr. 4 om Grenland [Act on Denmark's Accession to the European Communities Annex
1: Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession and Adjustments Protocol No. 4 on Greenland]

(Den.).

140. See Gerard-Rene de Groot, Latin American European Citizens: Some Consequences of
the Autonomy of the Member States of the European Union in Nationality Matters, MAAsTRICHT
J. EUR. & COMPAR. L. 115, 120 (2002).
141. See Gerard-Ren6 de Groot, Auf dem Weg zu einer europaischen Staatsangehbrigkeit
[Towards EuropeanCitizenship], in EUROPA '93: AUF DEM WEG ZUR EUROPAISCHEN UNION 87101
(Martin Coen & Albert Bleckmann eds., 1993) [hereinafter de Groot, Towards European
Citizenship]; Gerard-Rene de Groot, Visumplicht Antillianen/Arubanen en het Europese
burgerschap [Visa Requirements for Antilleans/Aruba and European Citizenship], 2000
MIGRANTENRECHT 51, 51-52 (2000) (Neth.); Rutsel Silvestre Jacinto Martha, Antillianen,
Arubanen en het vrije verkeer van werknemers in Europa [Antilleans, Arubans and the Free

Workers in
205, 211 (1992) (Neth.).

Movement of

Europe] STICHTING TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR ANTILLIAANS RECHT, JUSTICIA

142. See de Groot, Towards European Citizenship, supra note 141.
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additional mechanism to removea fundamental status, and without such
a mechanism, it seems difficult to understand how the loss of EU
citizenship is not arbitrary in the sense of not having a clear legal basis
prescribing loss, and arbitrary in the sense of being unreasonable if did
not fall within one of the various grounds for reasonable revocationof
status (e.g., in the European Convention on Nationality).
The conclusion must be that while it is possible for an EU member
state to withdraw from the EU, it is considerably more difficult for the
EU member state to revoke the individual's EU citizenship. It might be
that the member state successfully leaves the EU and yet is unsuccessful
in revoking EU citizenship.
V. THE CASE OF BREXIT

Focusing on the Brexit situation specifically, this Article will now
apply the law to determine whether UK nationals will lose EU
citizenship. Essentially, the loss of EU citizenship it is not necessarily the
automatic and correct outcome of Brexit. ScottishFirst Minister Alex
Salmond surprised many authorities when he argued that an independent
Scotland's nationals would continue to be EU citizens because they had
acquired EU citizenship via the UK's membership in the EU.1 43 Many
authorities disagreed concluding that surely it was only logical that when
a state left the EU that its nationals lost EU citizenship. This Article will
conclude the opposite.
The first rule to consider is the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT). The VCLT permits states a wide degree of flexibility
to adhere to or renounce treaties provided the terms of the treaty regarding
termination are respected.144 However, there is no discussion that the UK
143. See Aidan O'Neill, A Quarrelin a FarawayCountry?: Scotland, Independence and the
EU, EUTOPIA LAW (Nov. 14, 2011), https://eutopialaw.wordpress.com/2011/11/14/685/

[https://perma.cc/5GQ9-6LH5] ("[T]he question to ask is whether the CJEU would consider that
the fact that Scotland became independent required that all (or any portion) of the previous UK
citizenry thereby be deprived of their acquired rights as EU citizens? Given the CJEU's high
theology of the primacy of EU law, and of EU citizenship as being 'the fundamental status of
nationals of the Member States,' it is suggested that the most likely position that the Luxembourg
court would take, if faced with the question of Scottish independence, would be ... [to] rule that
Scotland and EWNI [England, Wales and Northern Ireland] should each succeed to the UK's
existing membership of the EU, but now as two States rather than as one.") (emphasis in original).
Further, First Minister Salmond's spokesman argued that Scotland would still be an EU
Member State. See Jeremy Fleming, Europe Question Dogs Scottish Referendum, EURACTIV
(Mar.
12, 2012), https://www.euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/news/europe-question-dogsscottish-referendum/ [https://perma.cc/NH2G-4HYV] ("Scotland is already part of the territory
of the European Union and the people of Scotland are citizens of the EU-and, as distinguished
legal, constitutional and European experts have confirmed, there is no provision for either of these
circumstances to change upon independence, and the rest of the UK will be exactly [sic] the same

position.").
144. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 54, openedfor signature May 23,
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can leave the EU and do so while complying with the VCLT. The second
issue under the VLCT is how the VCLT treats the rights of individuals.
45 does not help
The "acquired rights" provision of the VCLT
individuals,1 46 but only parties to the treaties, i.e., states. The VCLT does
47
provide that treaties cannot violate jus cogens1 but we are working with
the understanding that revocation of citizenship is not ajus cogens norm.
The VCLT, then, appears to be permissive of Brexit and does not clearly
prohibit the loss of EU citizenship.
Next, applying the principles of international institutional law, there
will be no further legal relationship in terms of EU rights and duties
between the former member and the remaining members following
Brexit, aside from the Withdrawal Agreement and other agreements
entered into. So, for example, aside from any new agreements, the UK
would not have any obligations towards the EU member states or member
state nationals under the terms of the EU Treaties. But this analysis
overlooks the important rights and duties, and more importantly,
fundamental legal bond, that has been formed directly between
individuals and the Union. The Union, after all, will continue to exist after
Brexit, as will EU citizenship, and the member states will continue to
have obligations towards othereach other and towards EU citizens. This
bond is not necessarily completely dependent on the legal relations
between states and international institutional law does not provide
guidance for these rights.
Instead human rights law, which does provide rules on nationality and
which has already applied to some degree to the legal bond inherent in
EU citizenship, will govern the situation. First, we need to determine
specifically which UK nationals have acquired EU citizenship, though
this question is not particularly difficult. The EU does not have a
citizenship law other than to refer to the TEU and discretion of the
48
member state. When the UK joined the European Communities1 and
later the EC transformed into the EU with its own citizenship, the UK
became a member state of the EU. Thus, its nationals could potentially
acquire EU citizenship. We then examine UK laws on nationality to see
which persons under that law are designated as eligible for EU
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
145. See id. art. 70(1)(b).
146. But see Rowena Mason, EU Citizens in UK Face Brexit Uncertainty, THE GUARDIAN

(May

15,

2016),

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/

2

016/may/15/eu-citizens-uk-brexit-

uncertainty-immigration-status-referendum [https:/perma.cc/F8ZV-97NZ] ("Gisela Stuart, the
chair of the Vote Leave campaign, said: 'You have got the Vienna [C]onvention [on the Law of
Treaties], which guarantees the rights of existing citizens and existing arrangements."').

147. See VCLT, supra note 144, arts. 53, 64.
148. See Treaty concerning the accession of the ... United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the European Economic Community and to the European Atmic Energy

Community, (1972) OJ L 73, 5 (Mar. 27, 1972).
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citizenship.1 49 Because it is an acquisition question, the UK retains
extensive discretion in deciding which persons are qualifying for UK
nationality and which are qualifying for EU citizenship. 150 As already
mentioned above, the UK even made a declaration on this issue. 5 1 In that
declaration, the UK limited its nationality, for purposes of EU citizenship,
to "British citizens" and excluded other categories. Thus, any UK
national holding "British citizenship" during the years that the UK was
an EU member state, clearly held an EU member state nationality during
that time and acquired EU citizenship. The other categories of UK
nationals did not. Also, British citizens who acquired that status after the
UK left the EU did not acquire EU citizenship. As these are acquisition
questions, they do not benefit from the more robust protections applied
to issues of loss.
The more difficult question is whether British citizens, who have
already acquired EU citizenship, might now lose it.15 2 Brexit is not a
case where EU citizenship throughout the Union is being abolished.
Neither is British citizenship being abolished. Instead, efforts are being
undertaken to revoke EU citizenship from British citizens. As noted
above, under human rights law, such an act cannot be arbitrary and
disproportionate, so we can first consider whether there is any valid legal
basis and competence for revoking EU citizenship from these individuals
and then consider whether that law is arbitrary or disproportionate.
As noted above, the EU does not have rules on loss of EU citizenship
other than to refer to member state nationality law, and the UK has no
laws on loss of EU citizenship only. The TFEU provision on EU
citizenship might contemplate a continuous "holding" of nationality in
order to retain EU citizenship, although this is not provided in the EU
treaties with that degree of specificity. 5 3 Thus, the revocation of EU
citizenship must be provided by some other, non-arbitrary, legal act in
order to have a legal basis.
We could consider for argument's sake that the UK might have
attempted to unilaterally revoke EU citizenship under domestic law
without revoking British citizenship. As a preliminary matter, this policy
149. See Denmark and the Treaty on European Union, supra note 88, annex

1§

A; Case

C-192/99, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't. ex parte Kaur, 2001 E.C.R. 1-1237,

1M

19-27; 1993 Citizenship Report, supra note 87; Third Citizenship Report, supra note 85;
Fourth Citizenship Report, supra note 87; Fifth Citizenship Report, supra note 88.
150. See Case C-192/99, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't. ex parte Kaur,

2001 E.C.R. 1-1237,

¶ 19-27; cf Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, 2010 E.C.R.

1-1449, 1-1488.
151.

See NOTE ON THE TERM "NATIONALS,"

supra

note 88.

152. Or who received EU citizenship in a separate grant when the UK joined the EU and
British citizenship became a qualifying EU member state nationality.
153. TFEU, supra note 66, art. 20(1) ("Every person holding the nationality of a Member

State shall be a citizen of the Union.") (not providing for loss of EU citizenship explicitly).
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is outside of the mandate of the Brexit referendum as it was simply a
4
question of membership in the EU as an international organization,'] and
the UK does not appear to have adopted any legislation on point.
Nonetheless, this outcome is not possible because after Brexit, the UK
would not be a member state of the EU. It might even be considered
interfering with internal EU affairs if it attempted to control EU
citizenship which was now foreign to the UK. Imagine if Ukraine sought
to terminate the EU citizenship of any Ukrainians that had acquired EU
citizenship. Ukraine, and the UK in our case, as non-EU member states,
simply has no jurisdiction over a matter under EU law.
Perhaps the UK could have revoked EU citizenship unilaterally before
Brexit? Again, it does not appear that the UK took this step, but even if it
had, it would be defective. While the UK has some competence to revoke
its own nationality from British citizens (not without controversy itself),
and with it EU citizenship (also not without controversy), the UK does
not appear to be competent to revoke EU citizenship only, separately
from British citizenship. There are no provisions for this kind of measure,
and it is not possible to sustain an argument that such authority can be
implied in the EU treaties. As discussed in the previous section, such an
interpretation would run counter to the notion that EU citizenship is a
fundamental status bringing the individual into a direct legal bond with
the Union. For example, where an EU member state incorrectly
interpreted the EU treaties and determined that a person had lost EU
citizenship yet maintained member state nationality, the EU would have
jurisdiction to review such a claim and would not be bound to respect
5
such an erroneous conclusion.1 5 The matter would only fall within the
154. See European Union Referendum Act 2015, c. 36,

§ 1(1), (4)-5) (UK).

(1) A referendum is to be held on whether the United Kingdom should remain a
member of the European Union.

(4) The question that is to appear on the ballot papers is'Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave
the European Union?'
(5) The alternative answers to that question that are to appear on the ballot papers
are'Remain a member ofthe European Union
Leave the European Union'.

155. Cf Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955

I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6) (holding that one

state is not bound to always respect the acts of another state granting or revoking nationality,

especially if such interpretation or application was not in compliance with international law).
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competence of the EU, and through it, to the EU member states
collectively. The UK would not be able to revoke EU citizenship
unilaterally in this way either. In any event, there is no evidence that the
UK ever took such a measure.
Perhaps the act of leaving the Union itself could be interpreted as a
collective renunciation of EU citizenship? This argument is not
convincing. First, as mentioned previously, there is no mechanism for
renunciation of EU citizenship, without renouncing member state
nationality. Second, as also mentioned above, renunciation calls for an
individualized expression of intent on the part of the renunciant. Clearly,
the act of leaving the Union did not amount to a collective renunciation
of UK nationality, as a significant percentage of UK nationals clearly
very much wanted to retain their EU citizenship.
It would seem that the only way individuals could potentially have
their EU citizenship revoked, when not losing the underlying member
state nationality, would be to include explicit terms in the EU-UK
Withdrawal Agreement on EU citizenship revocation, which was not
done.1 56 The Withdrawal Agreement does not explicitly provide for the
withdrawalof EU citizenship from UK nationals.'1 7 Numerous provisions
in the Withdrawal Agreement on the residual rights of EU citizens and
UK nationals in each other's territories strongly suggest that UK nationals
are no longer EU citizens,15 8 but this is an assumption and it is at least
debatable that such legal effect is not included in the instrument itself.1 59
The loss of EU citizenship is presented as if UK nationals have already
lost EU citizenship prior to the adoption and entry into force of the
Withdrawal Agreement,1 60 presumably based on the conclusion that UK
nationals lost EU citizenship by automatic operation of law when the UK
withdrew. But, this interpretation is not without its own problems. For
156. See generally Withdrawal Agreement, supra note 2.
157. See generally Withdrawal Agreement, supra note 2.
158. See Withdrawal Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl., arts. 2, 9, 13-18, 20, 22-23, 26-28,
30, 32, 159; Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland pmbl., art. 3, 2019 O.J. (C 384 I) 92 (EU);

Protocol on Gibraltar pmbl., art. 1, 2019 O.J. (C 384 1) 143 (EU).
159. See, e.g., Withdrawal Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2(c) ("'Union citizen' means any
person holding the nationality of a Member State"); id art. 2(d) ("'United Kingdom national'
means a national of the United Kingdom").
160. See, e.g., Withdrawal Agreement, supra note 2, art. 13(1) ("Union citizens and United
Kingdom nationals shall have the right to reside in the host State under the limitations and
conditions as set out in [various articles of the TFEU and Directive 2004/38/EC."); id. art. 14(1)
("Union citizens and United Kingdom nationals, their respective family members, and other
persons, who reside in the territory of the host State in accordance with the conditions set out in
this Title shall have the right to leave the host State and the right to enter it, as set out in Article

4(1) and the first subparagraph of Article 5(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC, with a valid passport or
national identity card in the case of Union citizens and United Kingdom nationals, and with a
valid passport in the case of their respective family members and other persons who are not Union
citizens or United Kingdom nationals.").
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some of the same reasons discussed above, in interpreting such a treaty
between the UK and EU, we cannot easily find that EU citizenship
revocation is implied. Again, EU citizenship is a fundamental status that
grants access to a wide range of civil rightsand brings the person into
direct political bond with the Union. The loss of EU citizenship is such a
consequential outcome, potentially contrary to the wishes of many
Britons and with human rights implications, that it would need to be
expressly included in the Withdrawal Agreement. It would be very
difficult to find these terms in a treaty by implication.
Even if EU citizenship revocation is the intended outcome and we can
find terms on this point implicit in the text, the revocation must still
comply with the limitations in international law discussed in this Article.
As discussed above, states may not revoke nationality in such a way as it
infringes on the sovereignty of another state. This result would be a case
where a state denationalized its citizen(s) while abroad, rendering them
stateless, and effective "dumping" them on the other state. While it is true
that Brexit will not render people technically stateless since UK nationals
in the EU would always be permitted to return to the UK, this conclusion
is not the entire story. UK nationals may have lived abroad in the EU for
a considerable time and intertwined their lives with their EU member
state of residence. That being said, if those individuals lose EU
citizenship, the EU member state in which they reside would not face
more burdens than before Brexit. Certainly these EU member states
would need to now tolerate the residence of individuals who have lost
their legal rights to residence, but aside from the formal legal
classification of their status, substantively little would change. For these
reasons, Brexit and the loss of EU citizenship of UK nationals abroad
would not significantly infringe the sovereignty of other states.
However, even if we can agree that the UK was successful in taking
either a unilateral measure to abolish EU citizenship or including those
terms in the Withdrawal Agreement by implication, we still trigger a
Rottmann problem. Because the UK is not revoking or abolishing its own
nationality, with an impacton EU citizenship, it is admittedly not a
precise Rottmann situation; however, Rottmann was concernedwith the
effect of loss of EU citizenship on a person through action of the state, so
if this situation can easily be assimilated to Rottmann. As such, the
63
62
revocation must be legitimate,1 6 1 proportionate' and not arbitrary.1
First, international law generally requires some willful, positive act on
1
the part of the person concerned to terminate nationality. 6' Second,
161.
162.
163.
164.

See Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. 1-1449, 1-1489.
See id. at I-1489-90.
See id. at 1-1489.
See European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, art. 7(3) (limiting loss of

nationality);

id.

art. 5(1) (providing for grounds which are per se procedurally or substantively
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nationality revocation cannot be imposed on a group, but can only follow
an individualized determination.1 65 It is difficult to identify the cause of
the revocation of EU citizenship as none of the persons losing the status
committed any acts that would be grounds for revocation. Many are, in
effect, bearing the consequences of actions of others as a group. Thus, it
would be possible for a protocol to the Withdrawal Agreement to provide
for an individual renunciation option, but a non-consensual revocation
must comply with the other protections.
Looking at the prohibition of arbitrary withdrawal more closely,
revocation of EU citizenship without consent of the individual may be
arbitrary both from a procedural and substantive perspective. As for the
procedural aspect of arbitrariness, the revocation would need to be
provided in law and in compliance with UK constitutional norms.
However, procedural arbitrariness is an international law standard than is
not necessarily accepting a domestic court's interpretation of its own laws
as controlling.1 66
Depending on how the UK approaches the revocation, it might be
procedurally arbitrary if it is not part of the mandate from the referendum,
specifically, whether the referendum constituted the will of the people.
Setting aside the apparently aggressive role of Russian propaganda in the
Leave campaign,' 7 the referendum did not comply with what we would
normally expect to be a democratic expression of will. For example, the
rules on voting in the referendum limited the electors to those
"who .. . would be entitled to vote as electors at a parliamentary election
in any constituency" which was not inclusive of the entire UK national
population. 168 However, the EU Referendum Act 2015 includes` as
potential electors Irish and Commonwealth citizens. 169 In. the first case,
Irish nationals are also EU citizens, and their EU citizenship was never
in jeopardy, so why they would vote in the election for the UK to leave
the EU is quite odd and can only be understood in the unique context of
Anglo-Irish history. That being said, it is highly unusual that foreign EU
arbitrary).
165. See id. art. 7(3) (limiting loss of nationality); id. art. 5(1) (providing for grounds which
are per se procedurally or substantively arbitrary).
166. See Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 74 (Feb. 6,

2001).

167. See, e.g., Jamie Rigg, The True Extent of Russian Meddling in Brexit Remains Murky,
(Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/12/15/facebook-twitter-russiabrexit-interference/ [https://perma.cc/2XY6-WQWQ].
168. See European Union Referendum Act 2015, c. 36, § 2(1)(a) (UK) ("Those entitled to
vote in the referendum are-the persons who, on the date of the referendum, would be entitled to
vote as electors at a parliamentary election in any constituency").
ENGADGET

169. See id. c. 36,

§ 2(2)(a)-(b) ("A person falls within this subsection [entitled to vote in

the referendum] if the person is either-a Commonwealth citizen, or a citizen of the Republic of
Ireland.").
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member state nationals would be permitted to vote to leave the EU when
those nationals will be permitted to retain their EU citizenship
regardless of the outcome of the referendum. However, in the second
case of Commonwealth citizens, these persons are not even EU citizens,
so for them as well, the lack of EU citizenship was not an issue. In fact,
they might have the perverse incentive to vote Leave to increase their
leverage in the UK labor market. Here as well it is difficult to understand
how foreign nationals could opine on whether UK nationals must retain
or lose their EU citizenship. Given the very narrow margin of success of
the referendum, these small issues are not insignificant. If the referendum
had a democratic deficit, then we might conclude that the will of the
people was not clearly expressed and thus the very significant outcome
of EU citizenship revocation as a consequence of Brexit is not reasonable.
More specifically, it might be that leaving the EU would be reasonable,
but the revocation of EU citizenship, over human rights concerns, is not.
Thus, Brexit remains legally valid and the UK is no longer an EU member
state, but without a mandate to include treaty terms that arbitrarily revoke
EU citizenship.
In addition, such a revocation might have a retroactive legality
problem when applying this rule to anyone currently holding EU
citizenship. Unless we could find that revocation of EU citizenship
without revocation of the dependent EU member state nationality was
already implied in the law previously, we have a clear case of amending
the law to provide for the possibility of citizenship revocation.
Citizenship is not generally considered a criminal penalty, and instead is
a civil one, and the CFR only expressly covers legality in criminal
matters, 7 0 but this distinction does not entirely insulate any change from
legality concerns.
However, arbitrariness has a substantive aspect as well. Several
substantive issues can be identified. For example, looking at UK
nationals resident or with long standing ties to EU member states, these
individuals may have investments, homes, and lives that are rendered
unstable and unpredictable. There may even be a violation of the right to
family life under the European Convention on Human Rights as well for
71
those who have married nationals of other EU member states.1

170. See CFR, supra note 65, art. 49.
171. See, e.g., Maslov v. Austria, 2008-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 301;

Oner

v. Netherlands, 2006-XII

Eur. Ct. H.R. 129; Keles v. Germany, App. No. 32231/02, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 12 (2007); Yilmaz
v. Denmark, App. No.
v. Germany, App. No. 52853/99, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 23 (2004); Amrollahi
60 5
cc/XW73[https://perma
56811/00 (July 11, 2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i-001-60
DJA7]; Boultif v. Switzerland, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 119; Dalia v. France, 1998-1 Eur. Ct. H.R.
76; Beldjoudi v. France, 234 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992); Moustaquim v. Belgium, 193 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1991).
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The cause of revocation must also have valid grounds. Revocation
would be excused if it involved the voluntary acquisition of another
nationality; acquisition of the nationality by fraud or deception; voluntary
service in a foreign military force; conduct seriously prejudicial to the
vital interests of the state; lack of a genuine link between the state and a
national habitually residing abroad; or failure of a child to fulfill
preconditions established by law, 172 but none of those situations appear
to apply. If we follow the European Convention on Nationality as a guide
for exemptions from arbitrariness, we do not find the political
reorganization of the state as an exemption. 17 3 As we saw with the law on
state succession or changes in territory, individuals are usually given
some choice in elected to retain nationality when this type of
reorganization occur. It could be argued that maintenance of UK
nationality was "acquisition" of another nationality, although this
argument is difficult to sustain. However, dual nationality can be valid
ground for revoking .nationality, so British citizens who also hold the
nationality of another EU member state could lose the EU citizenship
they derived from UK nationality under such a standard without the act
being arbitrary; however, this outcome would be pointless because they
would continue to hold EU citizenship by virtue of their other EU
member state nationality. However, revoking EU citizenship from only
one group of people on this ground could also be problematic from the
perspective of discrimination.
A further aspect of arbitrariness, sometimes treated as a distinct test,
is that revocation of nationality cannot be discriminatory. 174 In the case
of Brexit, such revocation of EU citizenship would be implemented
purely on the basis of member state nationality. Not only does
international law prohibit discriminatory nationality revocation, but EU
law does so also. The EU treaties provide that the EU institutions can act
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of "sex, racial or ethnic origin,
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation."1 75 None of these
categories clearly covers Brexit and, in any event, this is only a
permissive provision allowing the EU to act. It would not prohibit these
acts on its own. The CFR also prohibits discrimination on "any ground"
and includes as examples "sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin,
genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other
opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability,
172. See, e.g., European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, art. 7 (limiting scenarios
for loss of nationality).
173. See European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, art. 7(3) (limiting loss of
nationality); id. art. 5(1) (providing for grounds which are per se procedurally or substantively
arbitrary).
174. See, e.g., id, art. 5(1).
175. See TFEU, supra note 66, art. 19(1).
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age or sexual orientation." 176 Following the list a b o v e, we could argue
ejusdem generis that national origin or a comparable status was also
protected.
However, the TEU and CFR also prohibit explicitly any
17 7 Any agreement between the
discrimination on grounds of nationality.
EU and UK to revoke EU citizenship from UK nationals only, who, at
the time, would of course still have been EU citizens, would have been a
clear distinction on the basis of nationality and violation of the TEU itself.
Arguably, the EU would not have the competence to enter into such a
treaty with one, soon to be, former member state dissolving its legal bond
with some EU citizens on this basis. Even if we agreed that, as a treaty
amending the TEU, the EU could discriminate among EU citizens for
citizenship revocation on the basis of nationality, those terms would
certainly need to be explicit in the amendment to the TEU to create an
effective exception and overcome normative conflict. As mentioned
above, it is quite difficult to presume that the EU implicitly agreed to
terms that run contrary to a such a fundamental rule in the EU legal order.
However, in addition to EU law, states may not discriminate generally
in their nationality law on revocation under human rights law.
International law prohibits revocation on the basis of race, color,
ethnicity, gender or sex, religion, social origin, language, property, birth
or "other status," political opinion or "other opinion."178 On its face, the
revocation of EU citizenship does not appear to touch on any of these
grounds; however, British nationals are losing their citizenship arguably
based on national origin (only persons with a national origin in the
UK),1 7 9 and this is also a prohibited ground for discrimination.
Withdrawal of EU citizenship from a group of people based on national
origin would be arbitrary under any reading of human rights law;
although, the withdrawal of EU citizenship from UK nationals only could
be aligned with British citizenship, not necessarily national origin. The
current trend in human rights law on national origin discrimination
180 though distinguishing between the
appears to permit this distinction,
18
two statuses is difficult. 1
176. See CFR, supra note 65, art. 21(1).
177. See TFEU, supra note 66, art. 18; CFR, supra note 65, art. 21(2).
178. See CFR, supra note 65, art. 21(1).

179. See, e.g., H.R.C. Res. 20/5, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 13/2, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res.
10/13, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 7/10, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 2005/45, supra note 16;

H.R.C. Res. 1999/28, supra note 15; id. ¶ 2; H.R.C. Res. 1998/48, supra note 15,

¶ 2; H.R.C. Res.

1997/36, supra note 15, 1 2.
180. See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. U.A.E.), Judgment, 2021 I.C.J. 4, ¶ 105 (Feb. 4) (rejecting claim
of discrimination by the UAE against Qataris on the basis of citizenship, not national origin).
181. See Comm'n. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Jurisdiction of the
Inter-State Communication by Qatar against the United Arab Emirates, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/99/3
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In the alternative, withdrawal of EU citizenship on the basis of
political' 8 2 (or other) 8 3 opinion could also be prohibited. One could
imagine an argument that EU citizenship is being withdrawn based on the
political views of UK nationals voting to withdraw the state of the UK
from the Union, as well as the political views attributed to "Remain"
voters who might actually disagree. The Brexit referendum did not
contain any question about abolishing EU citizenship and was instead
phrased only about the membership of the state in the Union.1 84
Furthermore, the list of discriminatory bases is not limited to the
examples given, so one could also imagine other similar and related
claims.1 85
Lastly, any revocation of citizenship, even if it is not arbitrary, must
also be proportionate. Advocate General Szpunar has identified the lack
of any proportionality assessment of the impact of loss of EU citizenship
on the individual as highly problematic.1 86 Furthermore, such a
proportionality assessment must be individualized.' 87 Szpunar has even
rejected whether the individual undertook the loss of member state
nationality, and thus EU citizenship, voluntarily, as irrelevant to the
individualized proportionality assessment in some cases, such as
renunciation for purpose of acquiring a different nationality.1 88 It is
(Aug. 30, 2019) (tentatively accepting the claim of discrimination by Qatar against the UAE,
though complaint is pending); Comm'n. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Jurisdiction
of the Inter-State Communication by Qatar against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, U.N. Doc.

CERD/C/99/5 (Aug. 30, 2019).
182. See, e.g., H.R.C. Res. 10/13, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 7/10, supra note 15; H.R.C.
Res. 2005/45, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 1999/28, supra note 15.
183. See, e.g., H.R.C. Res. 20/5, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res. 13/2, supra note 15; H.R.C. Res.

10/13, supra note 15.
184. See European Union Referendum Act 2015, c. 36, § 1(4)-(5) (UK).
185. See, e.g., Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 15, art. 9; ICERD, supranote 40, art. 5;
European Convention on Nationality, supra note 13, art. 5(1); Acquisition of Polish Nationality,
Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 7, at 15 (Sept. 15); Draft Articles on Nationality,
supra note 10, art. 15 (prohibiting nationality discrimination "on any ground").

186. See Case C-118/20, JY v. Wiener Landesregierung, ECLI:EU:C:2021:530,

¶ 98 (July

1, 2021) ("It is clear from the order for reference that no review of the proportionality of the
contested decision in the light of EU law has been conducted.").
187. See id. ¶ 99 ("Accordingly, in order for such a decision to be compatible with the
principle of proportionality, the relevant national rules must permit an individual examination of
the consequences of revoking the assurance from the point of view of EU law."); Case C-221/17,
Tjebbes v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, ECLI:EU:C:2019:189, ¶ 41 (Mar. 12, 2019).

188. See Case C-118/20, JY, ECLI:EU:C:2021:530,

¶¶ 100-01 ("The referring court asks

whether the mere fact that JY renounced her citizenship of the Union and relinquished,
voluntarily, her citizenship of the Republic of Estonia can be the decisive factor in the context of
a review of proportionality.... [T]he situation of a national of a Member State such as JY, who

has renounced her original nationality with the sole aim of satisfying the condition for the
assurance of the grant of Austrian nationality laid down in national legislation ... is immaterial
when it comes to determining whether the revocation of the assurance as to the grant of the
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quite difficult to understand how the loss of EU citizenship for millions
of EU citizens, many residing and have integrated into the social
communities of various EU member states for decades, is proportionate
to the goal of the UK leaving the Union as a political matter. There is
perhaps a sense that loss of EU citizenship is the natural outcome of
Brexit, but it is not a necessary condition for leaving the Union. It could
be considered disproportionate that a territory can leave the EU, but its
nationals retain EU citizenship, obliging the remaining members of the
EU to grant them EU citizenship rights without their nationals enjoying
reciprocity. However, this outcome is already the case for many
thousands of people who live in territories outside the EU but who might
still qualify for nationality in an EU Member State, and thus EU
citizenship, by right of jus sanguinis. We can also recall that the EU
grants rights equivalent to EU citizenship fairly liberally so permitting
British citizens to retain. their EU citizenship and its rights would not be
out of step with other existing EU policy. For example, a non-member
state national is permitted residence in the EU for family reunification
purposes and retains that right even if the family member who held EU
89
citizenship dies or divorces the person.1 Therefore, the revocation of EU
citizenship would-appear to place a surprise, disproportionate burden on
thousands of individuals for the distinct goal of securing one EU member
state's act to terminate political membership in the Union.
The EU and UK might attempt in a protocol to the Withdrawal
Agreement to make EU citizenship revocation more proportionate by
including a grant of EU citizenship rights, though not citizenship, to these
persons. It is also true that many EU member states are granting generous
terms to UK nationals who remain in EU territory. These actual and
hypothetical measures, however, represents a diminished status
significantly different from the fundamental legal bond these persons
previous enjoyed with the Union. These individuals might have some
residency protections, but can longer vote or enjoy the consular protection
of other EU member states, among a host of other rights, and might lose
those residency rights upon leaving the state of residence. And if the full
extent of EU citizenship rights was restored, then, from a practical
perspective, it is unclear what the benefit would be to denying British
citizens EU citizenship. In any event, the removal of the status-as the
loss of the legal bond directly with the Union-would likely fail as well
on the other grounds mentioned above. Significantly, British citizens are
also no longer "European" in their identity.
Testing Brexit against human rights rather than merely international
institutional law produces a host of troubling problems, suggesting an
nationality has due regard to the principle of proportionality.") (emphasis in original).
189. See Council Directive 2004/38, art. 12, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77, 100 (EC).
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arbitrary, disproportionate revocation of EU citizenship beyond the
competence of the actors involved.
CONCLUSION

This Article has sought to bring a human rights narrative into the
discussion of Brexit, which has to date been dominated by a narrative
drawn from the law of treaties and international organizations. Yet, EU
citizenship is a very different creature than the residual, indirect benefits
individuals sometimes accrue from other international organizations.
This Article concludes that EU citizenship should continue for a
particular group of UK nationals: individuals qualifying as "British
citizens" under UK law, who have validly acquired EU citizenship, who
do not actively choose to renounce their EU citizenship and, potentially
also, are relying on their rights as EU citizens. It bears repeating that this
Article is not concluding that all UK nationals will continue to qualify for
EU citizenship. It is limited only to those who are British citizens and
have acquired EU citizenship already. Future generations will not qualify
because they cannot acquire it. The only legal means for achieving the
revocation of acquired EU citizenship for any other groups must be a
treaty between the EU and UK that expressly amends the treaties -on
European Union to revoke EU citizenship for this specific group.
Nonetheless, in order to comply with human rights, such an agreement
must also be non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory and proportionate. The
extreme outcome of revocation for the entire group without
individualized assessment is problematic, as are the generally arbitrary
nature of the action. Under human rights, this Article has concluded that
any UK national who has acquired EU citizenship prior to Brexit must
continue to enjoy EU citizenship. It is not permissible to revoke EU
citizenship from all UK nationals by implied or assumed automatic result
of leaving the EU.
The UK can, of course, leave the Union. This result does not preclude
the EU from adopting legislation in the future that might provide EU
citizenship to an expanded group of persons: UK nationals who did not
acquire EU citizenship prior to Brexit. This Article takes no view on
whether the member states of the Union, or perhaps the Union itself, have
the competence to amend the treaties or adopt legislation that would
provide for such a supplementary access mode for EU citizenship.
This Article has not taken a view on whether EU member state
nationals can continue to enjoy any rights and residency within the UK.
Most likely, they do not. Now that the UK is no longer an EU member
state, the UK no longer has EU obligations under the EU treaties, aside
from the Withdrawal Agreement, and the benefits of EU citizenship
cannot be invoked against the UK. Thus, strangely, some UK citizens
would have the right to move to the EU and enjoy EU rights there, but
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EU member state nationals would not have the right to move to the UK
vice versa.
UK nationals who continue to hold EU citizenship do create a
logistical challenge for obvious reasons, should the argument in this
Article be accepted. The EU does not issue its own passports or other
identity document evidencing EU citizenship. UK passports are
themselves now insufficient to evidence status, whether they are still
burgundy and bear the words "European Union" or not. As the UK is no
longer an EU member state, those documents cannot conclusively
establish status. Clearly, this challenge must be addressed, once
continued EU citizenship is acknowledged.
But these possible complications should not discourage the assertion
that UK nationals, who haveacquired EU citizenship, should not lose it
arbitrarily. In fact, the risk of not recognizing the continuing EU
citizenship of these UK nationals is to diminish EU citizenship generally.
It threatens its nature as a fundamental status linking the individual
directly to the Union, and relegates it to a mere benefit for individuals
that states can adopt and dispose of arbitrarily. As such, failure to
recognize EU citizenship in this case, contrary to human rights, would so
damage EU citizenship, that we might wonder why the Treaties on
European Union envisioned citizenship at all, rather than a mere
collection of rights.
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